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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the impact of three public policies. Each essay at-
tempts to identify the effects of a specific public policy using different methods.
The first studies the effect of low-cost intervention on tax compliance. To overcome
confounding factors, I use a regression discontinuity design that exploits a discrete
increase in the probability of receiving a non-compliance notification. Results indi-
cate that the notification significantly increases taxes paid by around $1,400, or 70
percent. These findings indicate that inexpensive tax compliance interventions can
be used effectively by tax authorities in low-income countries.
The second essay studies data collected in a field experiment that provides in-
formation to households to promote conservation of electricity. Households received
one of three different information interventions: (1) make a price notch salient, (2)
make a social comparison, or (3) do both. Results corresponding to households with
historical consumption above the notch indicate that the social comparison infor-
mation reduces consumption by around 1%, and that the price salience information
effect is not statistically significant. These findings imply that the social comparison
treatment was more effective in promoting conservation. However, there is also sug-
gestive evidence that the effect of the price salience treatment exists for households
who were just above the notch, whereas the effect of the social comparison is signifi-
cant for both households who were just above and well above the notch. The results
suggest that similar interventions could be used in longer term projects to promote
conservation and reduce the fiscal burden of electricity subsidies.
The last essay examines the effect of the Arizona Immigration Law of 2010 (SB
1070) on the noncitizen Hispanic state population. Results indicate that this bill
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produced a significant reduction in the proportion of Hispanic noncitizens living in
Arizona estimated to be between 10% and 16%. However, this effect lasted less
than one year, as the evidence suggests that it vanishes after a few months. The
findings imply that the response of the undocumented population facing higher risk
of deportation is to quickly move out. The findings also suggest that when that risk
diminishes, the undocumented population tends to increase.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Measuring the impact of public policies is very important for policymakers and
academics. For the former group, an accurate policy evaluation helps to take bet-
ter decisions and to reassign resources. For the latter group, studying the impact
of public policies increases the understanding of economic systems. In the recent
years, empirical economics has experienced what Angrist and Pischke (2010) call a
“credibility revolution”. This revolution has impacted the research methods used to
evaluate policies, emphasizing the importance of the correct identification of treat-
ment effects. In this context, the main objective of this dissertation is to identify the
effects of three public policies using state-of-the-art methods.
The first essay studies tax evasion, which is a significant problem facing countries
around the world that imposes efficiency costs and creates inequality. As a result,
understanding the impact of various forms of tax compliance enforcement mecha-
nisms is required to improve the efficiency of tax systems. This issue is particularly
important for low-income countries, where the size of the shadow economy is esti-
mated to be around 35 percent of GDP, versus 17 percent for high-income countries
(Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010).
The main objective of the first essays is to examine whether low-cost tax en-
forcement methods can be used to improve compliance in low-income countries. The
leading challenge that must be overcome in order to do so is the selection bias that
arises because enforcement usually targets taxpayers who are more likely to evade
taxes. To overcome this type of selection bias I use a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) that takes advantage of a discrete increase in the probability of receiving a
formal notification (treatment). In particular, I use information corresponding to
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taxpayers for which under-reporting of the Income Tax Advance (ITA) in Ecuador
for the fiscal year 2010 was detected.
Results indicate that tax notifications cause the probability of correcting the
tax report to significantly increase by around 67 percentage points and the amount
reported by approximately $1,400 or 70 percent. I also find suggestive evidence that
the effect persists for the following year.
These results have significant implications for tax compliance in low-income coun-
tries. They indicate that formal notifications are effective in reducing evasion and
increasing tax revenues. Moreover, the results suggest that the expansion of enforce-
ment methods such as this could further increase tax compliance and revenues, and
potentially reduce the efficiency costs and inequality created by tax evasion.
The second essay explores the effects of information intervention as incentives to
promote conservation of energy, which has become a significant matter in public pol-
icy in recent years. Traditionally, economic or price measures have been considered
the first-best policies to induce conservation. However, there is mixed evidence that
these non-linear incentives alter behavior in the energy sector. In contrast, recent re-
search has shown that non-pecuniary strategies can be used to influence behavior in
a variety of areas. In the energy domain, the use of social comparisons is increasingly
seen as a powerful policy instrument. The alternative policy instrument – prices –
can face large political constraints. Policymakers and regulators are generally re-
luctant to set prices at the true marginal social cost for utilities such as electricity.
In fact, in many developing countries energy prices are set far below the market
price, and such government subsidy schemes contribute to government debt. In that
context, an important question is whether information interventions can be used in
developing countries to induce conservation of energy, and therefore reduce funds
allocated to subsidies. Despite the growing research on the effects of both non-linear
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incentives and social comparisons on conservation, little is known about the relative
efficacy of these instruments. In that context, the main goal of the second essay
is to identify the relative magnitudes of these two incentives in a developing coun-
try. To reach this goal, a large scale randomized controlled trial was implemented
in collaboration with the Quito Electric Company (Empresa Ele´ctrica Quito-EEQ).
In the field experiment, informational letters were attached to the electricity bills of
randomly selected households in March 2014.
Typically it is very difficult to find utilities that have large changes in tariffs for
small changes in consumption. However, households in Ecuador, and in Quito in
particular, face a tariff with large changes in the total electricity bill for an addi-
tional kWh of monthly consumption (i.e. notches). These notches do not appear to
induce a consumption reduction because there is no evidence of discontinuity of the
distribution before the notches or bunching around them in historical consumption
data. This might be evidence of the lack of salience of the complex electricity tariff
in Quito.
In the randomized controlled trial the effects of three information interventions
are explored. The first treatment makes the most important notch (the 111th kWh
consumed increases the total electricity bill by around 40%) salient. The second
makes a social comparison. Finally, the two pieces of information together are used
as a third treatment to test for additive effects.
For the households with historical consumption above the notch, I find that the
social comparison treatment reduces consumption by 1%, and it is statistically sig-
nificant. On the other hand, the price salience treatment estimate is approximately
one third of that of the social comparison, and it is not statistically significant.
However, there is suggestive evidence that the effect of the price salience treatment
exists only for households who were just above the notch, whereas the effect of the
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social comparison is significant for both households who were just above and well
above the notch. Importantly, none of the treatments have a significant effect for
households historically consuming below the notch. Hence, there is no evidence of
a “boomerang” effect created by the information intervention. These results con-
tribute to the understanding of the capacity of information interventions to promote
conservation of energy in the context of a developing country. The larger effect of
the social comparison treatment suggests that similar interventions could be used in
longer term projects to induce conservation and reduce the fiscal burden of electric-
ity subsidies. The findings for the price notch salience treatment support previous
literature finding that non-linear price incentives are not effective in reducing con-
sumption of electricity. However, results also suggest that information that makes
salient non-linear price schemes might be effective if targeted to the population with
consumption levels just above price notches.
The last essays studies immigration legislation and its consequences, which are
among the most important topics in the public policy debates in the U.S. In recent
years a series of measures at the federal and state level have modified the immigration
system. In that context, the main objective of the essays is to estimate the effect
of state immigration legislation on the stock of undocumented population. To reach
this goal, I study the Arizona Senate Bill 1070 enacted in 2010 (SB 1070), which is
arguably one of the most strict state immigration bills passed in recent years.
I estimate the effect of this law on the composition of the population Arizona,
specifically, in the proportion of noncitizen Hispanics living in that state. In order
to get a consistent estimate of this effect, I use state-level aggregate data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the synthetic control method proposed in
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) to calculate a counterfactual for Arizona.
In that sense this paper follows closely Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2014), which
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estimates the impact of the Arizona’s 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) using
synthetic control methods, and finds that this law caused a significant reduction in
the proportion of the Hispanic noncitizen population in Arizona.
One contribution of this paper is that it assess the flexibility of the illegal popula-
tion to move as a response to changing conditions. In that sense, this paper joins the
small, but growing literature, studying the response of undocumented individuals to
unfavorable conditions (See for instance, Cadena and Kovak (2013), Watson (2013)).
Results indicate that the Arizona Immigration Law produced a statistically sig-
nificant reduction in the proportion of noncitizen Hispanics in Arizona between 10%
and 16%. However, this effect lasted less than one year, as the evidence suggests
that it vanishes after a few months.
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2. THE IMPACT OF LOW-COST INTERVENTION ON TAX COMPLIANCE:
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a significant problem facing countries around the world. It imposes
efficiency costs by either reducing the availability of public goods and services, or
requiring higher and more distortionary taxes to meet a fixed revenue requirement.
Tax evasion also creates inequality because taxpayers with the same tax liability
end up with different tax burdens (Slemrod, 2007). As a result, understanding the
impact of various forms of tax compliance enforcement mechanisms is required to
improve the efficiency of tax systems. This issue is particularly important for low-
income countries, where the size of the shadow economy is estimated to be around
35 percent of GDP, versus 17 percent for high-income countries (Schneider, Buehn
and Montenegro, 2010).
The main objective of this paper is to examine whether low-cost tax enforcement
methods can be used to improve compliance in low-income countries. The leading
challenge that must be overcome in order to do so is the selection bias that arises
because enforcement usually targets taxpayers who are more likely to evade taxes.
Thus, to credibly estimate the causal effect of enforcement on compliance, one must
disentangle the effect of the enforcement from the effect of being the type of taxpayer
who is targeted for enforcement.
This paper overcomes the selection bias by using a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) that takes advantage of a discrete increase in the probability of receiving a
formal notification (treatment). Specifically, I compare the behavior of taxpayers
marginally selected to be sent a notification of non-compliance (because they under-
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reported an amount that falls just above a selection threshold) to the response of
those marginally not chosen (because they under-reported an amount that falls just
below a selection threshold).
The identifying assumption of this paper is that all determinants of tax compli-
ance, other than the formal notification, are continuous across this selection thresh-
old. This is likely to hold, as the cut-off was defined after taxpayers had reported
their tax liability, was based on labor constraints limiting the delivery of the noti-
fications, and was never announced to or known by taxpayers. Moreover, no other
enforcement policy changed at the selection threshold. In addition, I show empirical
evidence that supports the identifying assumption. The observed determinants of
tax compliance are continuous across the threshold, there is no evidence of bunch-
ing around the cut-off, and the RDD estimates do not change significantly when
additional covariates are included. As a result, I am confident that this research
design distinguishes the effect of the enforcement method from the effects of other
observable and unobservable factors.
In examining the effectiveness of tax compliance strategies, this paper joins the
literature aimed at estimating the degree of evasion as well as the impact of dif-
ferent strategies on compliance. One part of the literature has used data from the
Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the U.S. to examine the impact
of aggregate audit rates on compliance (See for instance Dubin and Wilde (1988);
Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1990); Plumley (1996); Dubin (2007)).1
Much of the recent research on tax compliance has come from laboratory exper-
iments, which have the advantage of controlling for particular circumstances such
as enforcement effort, tax rates, income levels, etc. For instance, Alm, Cronshaw
1The Tax TCMP is carried out by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Randomly individual
income tax returns are selected and subject to an audit (Internal Revenue Service, 1996, 2007).
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and McKee (1993) found that audit rules that depend on the behavior of taxpayers
generate greater compliance than random audit rules.2
More related to this paper is the smaller literature in which randomized controlled
field experiments were performed. In these studies, real taxpayers are exposed to vari-
ation in some controlled variable. For example, Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod
(2001) study the impacts of moral appeal letters on tax compliance in Minnesota,
and find that compliance was higher in the treatment groups, but the effect was not
significant. Torgler (2004) studies the effect of moral suasion on tax compliance in
Switzerland, and finds that a letter emphasizing the importance of compliance for
the development of the community had no effect.3
The literature on tax compliance has focused on traditional factors such as penal-
ties, probability of audits, and tax rates. In recent years, behavioral aspects such as
social norms and moral appeals have also been studied. Nonetheless, little attention
has been given to the effect of low-cost enforcement methods commonly used by tax
authorities.
In that context, one innovation of this paper is the analysis of an enforcement
strategy actually applied to increase compliance. In particular, I study the causal
effect of tax notifications on tax compliance. I use information corresponding to
taxpayers for which under-reporting of the Income Tax Advance (ITA) in Ecuador
for the fiscal year 2010 was detected. Specifically, among these taxpayers, I examine
all corporations as well as those individually-owned businesses that are obligated to
2Other studies using laboratory experiments to analyze tax compliance include Alm, Jackson
and McKee (1992, 1993); Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1999); Alm, Jackson and McKee (2009);
Alm, Cherry, Jones and McKee (2010); Bazart and Bonein (2014); Bosco and Mittone (1997);
Christian and Alm (2014); Djawadi and Fahr; Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg (1978); Guala and
Mittone (2005); Mittone (2006); Torgler (2002); Tan and Yim (2014), among many others.
3Other field experiments on tax compliance include Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001),
Hasseldine, Hite, James and Toumi (2007), Kleven et al. (2011), Gemmell and Ratto (2012), Fellner,
Sausgruber and Traxler (2013), and Pomeranz (2013).
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keep accounting records. Hereafter, the term taxpayer is used to refer to these two
groups.
This paper also contributes to the literature by applying a quasi-experimental
design to cleanly identify the effects of a low-cost tax enforcement method in a low-
income country. In particular, this is the first paper, to my knowledge, that uses RDD
to study tax compliance, and one of the few that analyses tax compliance in low-
income countries (see for instance Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2014); Kumler,
Verhoogen and Frias (2012)). Moreover, I am able to examine the persistence of the
effects of this low-cost tax enforcement method, which allows the empirical analysis
of an endogenous rule of enforcement (selection using a cut-off rule), instead of the
traditional constant probability of audit.
Results indicate that tax notifications cause the probability of correcting the
tax report to significantly increase by around 67 percentage points and the amount
reported by approximately $1,400 or 70 percent. The estimated impact represents
the marginal effect of sending an additional notification on reported taxes.
I also find suggestive evidence that the effect persists for the following year.
Treated units reported more Income Tax Advance in 2011 than the non-treated
group. Moreover, those receiving the tax notification were more likely to over-report
and less likely to under-report in that year. On average, and conditional on non-
compliance, taxpayers under-reported less in 2011 than in 2010. Interestingly, that
gap was greater for units receiving the treatment around the selection threshold. If
taxpayers believe that the probability of getting a tax notification is not random, but
an increasing function of the under-reported amount, then this suggests that some
of them strategically attempt to evade taxes while trying to avoid being notified.
These results have significant implications for tax compliance in low-income coun-
tries. They indicate that formal notifications are effective in reducing evasion and
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increasing tax revenues. Moreover, the results suggest that the expansion of enforce-
ment methods such as this could further increase tax compliance and revenues, and
potentially reduce the efficiency costs and inequality created by tax evasion.
2.2 Institutional Background
This paper analyzes taxpayers who under-reported the Income Tax Advance
(ITA) in Ecuador for the fiscal year 2010.4 In particular, among these taxpayers,
I examine all corporations and only those individually-owned businesses which are
obligated to keep accounting records.5 For them, the ITA is determined as the sum
of 0.4 percent of the total assets, 0.4 percent of the total taxable income, 0.2 percent
of net worth, and 0.2 percent of deductible expenses.6
This tax is determined when taxpayers file their income tax reports for the pre-
vious fiscal year. The applicable income tax to be filed during the next fiscal period,
which corresponds to the current period, is equal to the ITA or the regular income
tax, whichever is greater.7 In other words, the ITA is in practice a minimum income
tax. Moreover, in the current period, taxpayers have to pay an amount equal to this
tax minus taxes withheld in the previous period (i.e., anticipated payment).8 Table
B.1 presents examples for various cases. Other Latin-American countries that have
4The tax legislation pertinent for this research was in effect in the years 2010 and 2011. A few
reforms have been implemented since then; however, they are not relevant for the purpose of this
research.
5Individuals are obligated to keep accounting records if they carry out businesses and if they have
yearly revenues greater than $100,000, or yearly costs and expenses greater than $80,000, or begin
economic activities with a capital of at least $60,000. Individuals not obligated to keep accounting
records and those corporations that have contracts to explore and exploit hydrocarbons determine
the ITA as 50 percent of the previous year’s income tax minus withholdings corresponding to that
period.
6There are some exemptions to this formula for financial institutions, agricultural businesses,
leasing companies, new businesses, among others.
7The income tax for individuals is calculated using a progressive (from 5 percent to 35 percent)
tax schedule. The corporate income tax for 2010 and 2011 was calculated using a flat rate of 25
percent and 24 percent respectively.
8The anticipated ITA is split in two equal installments to be paid in July and September of the
corresponding year.
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taxes similar to the ITA include Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and
the Dominican Republic (Gonza´lez, 2009).
Since the ITA is not automatically calculated when taxes are filed, the actual
amount is determined by the taxpayer. To detect under-reporting, the Ecuadorian
Internal Revenue Service (SRI) takes the reported variables as given and applies the
corresponding formula. Thus, under-reporting is calculated as the difference between
the amount reported by the taxpayer and the one determined by the tax authority.
Hence, the measure of non-compliance analyzed in this paper is the result of an
incorrect application of the formula to calculate the ITA. More complex methods of
evasion such as under-statement of income or assets are not studied in this paper.9
To enforce ITA compliance, and according to Ecuadorian tax regulations, the
tax authority has implemented a system of notifications sent to taxpayers for whom
under-reporting is identified. In a first stage, “persuasive communications” are sent
to taxpayers for whom electronic mail is available. These warnings are only informa-
tive and state the detected difference and the steps needed to correctly re-file. Then,
in a second stage, written “notifications of differences” (hereafter, tax notifications)
are sent to selected taxpayers who have not correctly adjusted their tax reports yet,
including those who received the first communication and those who did not.10
This paper studies the causal effect of these tax notifications (treatment) on
9There are two main ways to evade the ITA: misusing the calculation formula and under-stating
the components of the formula. Arguably, the latter is riskier (accounting fraud may result in
criminal prosecution, whereas, the misuse of the formula might cost accrued interest and fees),
more difficult (double-accounting is necessary) and could increase the tax burden (for instance
under-stating expenses increases the income tax due). Hence, taxpayers trying to evade the ITA
may have incentives to misuse the formula instead of under-state its components. The next section
shows that in 2010 a relatively large number of taxpayers under-reported the ITA by applying the
calculation formula incorrectly.
10The deadline to file income tax reports in Ecuador is in March for individuals and in April for
corporations. The specific day depends on the ninth digit of the taxpayer identification number.
The tax authority starts sending persuasive communications to taxpayers under-reporting the ITA
around June. Tax notifications are sent after that. The precise dates are unknown by the researcher.
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compliance. These notices do not imply a penalty; however, taxpayers are warned
that they have under-reported the ITA and notified of the detected difference. The
notification states that if the difference is justified, or the tax report is correctly
adjusted within 20 business days of receiving the notice, no further action will be
taken.11 It also says that if the difference is not justified or corrected in time, the
tax authority will rectify the value of the tax and will send the taxpayer a bill to be
paid immediately according to the law.12
Written tax notifications are less expensive than intensive enforcement methods,
such as audits. Nevertheless, they still represent a cost. Hence, given the resource
constraints, not all taxpayers who under-report the ITA are sent these communica-
tions. The Department of Control of the SRI selects the taxpayers who are sched-
uled to be sent tax notifications. The selection is done for each of the 24 provinces of
Ecuador individually. In each province, taxpayers are ranked by their under-reported
amount. Then, the number of chosen taxpayers is determined as a function (unknown
by the researcher) of the number of tax officials available in each province. Specifi-
cally, for each province, only the taxpayers whose under-reported taxes are greater
than a given amount (selection threshold) are selected to be sent the notification.
It is important to mention that not all the selected taxpayers receive the tax
notification. It is possible that some of them are not found by the delivery person. On
the other hand, it is also possible that taxpayers not selected are sent the notification
anyway. However, as the results section shows, the probability of receiving the
notification increases discontinuously at the selection threshold.
11If the tax notification is received after the deadline to pay the first installment, interest is
accrued.
12The Ecuadorian tax regulations state that this bill will include accrued interest and a penalty
equal to 20 percent of the value of the ITA. There is an additional 20 percent fine if the taxpayer
did not determine this tax at all. The monthly interest rate on unpaid taxes for the third quarter
of 2010 was 1.021 percent. This interest rate is calculated as 1.5 times the 90-Day Loan Reference
Rate determined by the Central Bank of Ecuador.
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2.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper includes business-level observations corresponding
to the total number of taxpayers for whom the tax authority detected under-reporting
of the ITA 2010 before the selection process for the tax notifications (pre-treatment
ITA 2010).
The data were provided by the Ecuadorian Tax Authority, specifically by its Tax
Control Department and its Center of Fiscal Studies. These data consist of 39,223
observations (around 7 percent of the total number of corporations and individually-
owned businesses obligated to keep accounting records).13
To avoid confounding under-reporting with rounding, I restrict the sample to tax-
payers with under-reported pre-treatment ITA 2010 of more than one dollar (37,249
observations). Also, observations that belong to the 99 percentile of the continu-
ous outcome variables (introduced below) were trimmed out. These “outliers” drive
the local averages up in a manner that would not allow readers to distinguish local
effects graphically. These changes facilitate the presentation of graphical evidence
using outcome variables directly, instead of logarithmic transformations or estimated
regression residuals.
Importantly, these changes do not bias the estimators of the effect of the interven-
tion since the probability of being an “outlier” is not correlated with the treatment
variable. Using regression models similar to those utilized to estimate the main
results of this paper (presented in the next section), I found, across various specifica-
tions, no discontinuous change in the likelihood of being an “outlier” at the selection
threshold. In addition, the results of this paper are robust to these changes. The
resulting sample includes 36,457 observations.
13All the calculations of compliance were produced by the SRI.
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Table B.1 shows the frequencies of the data by province. Around 62 percent
of the observations belong to the two biggest provinces of Ecuador, Guayas and
Pichincha. Table B.1 also shows that 5,028 (13.79 percent) taxpayers were chosen
from the sample (using the selection thresholds explained before) nationally to be
sent the tax notification and that 4,822 (13.23 percent) actually received them (were
treated). This discrepancy occurs because the selection process was not perfectly
implemented as explained in the previous section.
Panel A of Table B.2 shows summary statistics of the outcome variables. The first
variable is binary and takes the value of one is the taxpayer corrected or justified the
detected difference by the end of 2010 and zero otherwise. This variable is used to
measure the effect of the enforcement method on compliance.14 Table B.2 shows that
around 23 percent of the taxpayers corrected their reports or justified the differences
by the end of the year.
The second outcome variable represents the post-treatment measure of the re-
ported ITA in 2010.15 In particular, this variable is the dollar amount of the ITA
2010, reported along with the income tax report corresponding to that year (filed
in 2011, see the previous section).16 This variable is used to analyze the effect of
the enforcement method on reported taxes. Its mean is US$ 1,804 with a standard
deviation of US$ 5,131.
To analyze the effects of the treatment for the following year, I use data on
the reported ITA 2011. To avoid confounding the effect under analysis with other
14For the taxpayers that received the tax notification a variable that specifies if they corrected or
justified the detected difference is used. For the taxpayers that did not receive this communication,
I have information on whether they re-filed their tax report or not by the end of the year. In some
cases there is still a difference between the new tax report and the amount estimated by SRI. If
that difference is less than one dollar, I consider that the taxpayer rectified the tax report.
15This variable includes changes to the ITA 2010, if any, made by the taxpayer after the treatment
period.
16Since 2000 the American Dollar is the official currency in Ecuador.
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enforcement programs in 2011, I consider the last report filed by the taxpayer before
June 2011.17 This variable has a mean of US$ 2,923 with a standard deviation of
US$ 6,907.
The dataset also includes the ITA 2011 calculated by the tax authority. This
variable was used to calculate under-reporting and over-reporting in 2011. Panel A
of Table B.2 shows that 60 percent of the taxpayers in the sample under-reported,
and that 28 percent over-reported in 2011. The median under-reported amount is
US$ 522 and the median over-reported amount is US$ 53.18
Additional covariates are included in some specifications to reduce the sample
variability of the estimates as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). Following
the literature on the determinants of tax compliance, additional covariates include
measures of the size of the business (total assets, taxable income, net worth de-
ductible costs, and expenses), characteristics of the business (years of operation,
special taxpayer indicator, indicator for corporations, economic activity fixed effects,
and province fixed effects), and characteristics of the legal representative (gender,
age, and level of education).19 All these variables correspond to the pre-treatment
period.20
Panel B of Table B.3 shows summary statistics for the covariates. Average taxable
income is US$ 422,448, with a standard variation of US$ 891,658. The other variables
representing the size of the business are also presented in the table. In addition, the
average age of the legal representatives is 48 years. Approximately 28 percent of them
17As noted before, the tax authority starts sending communications to taxpayers under-reporting
the ITA around June of each year.
18I code under-reporting (over-reporting) as 1 if there is a positive (negative) difference between
the ITA reported by the taxpayer and the one calculated by the tax authority of more than one
dollar.
19Special taxpayers are those required to withhold taxes from other taxpayers.
20Very comprehensive literature reviews on the determinants of tax compliance can be found in
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998); Slemrod (1992) and Torgler (2007).
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are female, and 45 percent have a college education. The average years of operation
of the businesses is 12.7 years. Around 5 percent of them are special taxpayers, and
57 percent are corporations.
2.4 Research Design
I use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the causal effect of tax
notifications on compliance. By taking advantage of a discrete increase in the proba-
bility of receiving these notifications, this paper compares the response of taxpayers
marginally selected to be sent the notifications (because their under-reported amount
falls just above a selection threshold) to the response of those marginally not chosen
(because their under-reported amount falls just below a selection threshold).
To apply this design, I use the selection thresholds or cut-offs for each province
to define the running variable. Since the selection cut-offs vary across provinces, the
running variable is centered (detected difference minus the cut-off in each province)
and standardized. Hence, the running variable is defined as standard deviations away
from the cut-offs.
The identifying assumption of the RDD in this context is that all determinants
of the outcome variables other than the tax notifications are continuous across the
threshold. Under that assumption, any discontinuity in outcome variables at the
cut-off is properly interpreted as the effect of the tax enforcement strategy, rather
than as the effect of other observable (income, assets, years of operation, etc.) or un-
observable (knowledge of regulations, tax evasion behavior, other tax enforcements
strategies, etc.) determinants of tax compliance.21 Consequently, under the identi-
21Among the unobservable enforcement strategies is the persuasive notification explained in the
previous section. There is no information about which taxpayers actually receive this communica-
tion; however it was sent to taxpayers for whom electronic mail was available. In that sense, it is
difficult to believe that the probability of receiving the persuasive notification changed discontinu-
ously at the selection threshold for the tax notifications.
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fying assumption, this design produces a consistent estimation of the causal effect of
tax the notifications.
Since the selection process was not implemented perfectly (as explained in the
previous section), an estimation of the discontinuity on the probability of treatment
(first stage) is needed. I estimate it by using a polynomial regression as follows:
treated = α1 + fl(d) + β1(above) + fr((above) ∗ d) + u (2.1)
In equation (1) treated is a binary variable equal to one if the taxpayer received
the tax notification and zero otherwise; d is the running variable as defined before;
fl and fr represent polynomial functions estimated to the left and to the right of
the cut-off point respectively; above is a binary variable equal to one if the centered
running variable positive and zero otherwise; and u is the error term.
The discontinuities on the outcome variables are estimated as follows:
outcome = α2 + hl(d) + β2(above) + hr((above) ∗ d) + e (2.2)
In equation (2) hl and hr represent polynomial functions estimated to the left
and to the right of the cut-off point respectively; e is the error term; and the other
variables are the same as in equation (1).
Hence, β1 is the estimator of the discontinuity of the probability to receive the
treatment and β2 is the estimator of the discontinuity in the outcome variable. As
discussed before, the jump in the probability of treatment is less than 100 percent.
Therefore, the discontinuities of the outcome variables represent the intent-to-treat
(ITT) effect. Thus, they have to be re-weighted by the treatment discontinuity.
Following Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001), I utilize a Fuzzy Regression
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Discontinuity Design (FRD) and apply Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to estimate
the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of the enforcement program. Robust
standard errors were used for all the specifications.
This identification strategy allows the estimation of a local effect that holds only
for those units around the selection threshold. Assuming that the effect of the treat-
ment is heterogeneous across units, the FRD identifies the effect for compliers. In
other words, the effect for those taxpayers who were treated because the amount they
under-reported was above the selection threshold, and would not have been treated
if the threshold were higher.
As it is well known in the RDD literature, it is desirable to use data close to the
cut-off point to avoid the potential bias of estimation of discontinuities with large
bandwidths. However, estimations with small bandwidths could produce imprecise
estimates. Hence, there is a tradeoff between bias and precision when selecting the
bandwidth. To address this issue, I report regression results using bandwidths of
1, 0.5, and 0.25 standard deviations, with and without additional predetermined
control variables.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Testing the Identifying Assumption
As discussed before, the identifying assumption in this paper is that all determi-
nants of tax compliance, other than the enforcement method, are continuous across
the selection threshold. This assumption will fail if taxpayers were able to manipu-
late the side of the threshold on which they fall, or if other tax policy or enforcement
method changed at the cut-off. That is arguably unlikely for a number of reasons.
As described before, the selection for treatment is implemented after taxes are
filed, which means there is no way for taxpayers to know beforehand where they are
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relative to the cut-off. Moreover, the selection method (not only the selection thresh-
old) is only known by tax officials and determined as a function of the availability
of tax officials in each province. Furthermore, the tax authority did not change any-
thing else at the cut-off level. That is, the cutoff was only used for this intervention,
and not for others.
Importantly, the empirical evidence is consistent with the lack of manipulation
around the selection threshold. Figure A.1 shows that there is no bunching in the
distribution around the cut-off that would suggest that taxpayers can control where
they are relative to it. I also use the density test suggested in McCrary (2008) and fail
to reject the null hypothesis of continuity of the density function at the threshold.22
Furthermore, the observed pre-treatment covariates are locally balanced around
the selection threshold. Figures A.2 trough A.11 show scatter plots of local averages
of the available pre-treatment covariates and the running variable along with fitted
values from a polynomial regression model, flexibly estimated on each side of the
cut-off point. It is difficult to see discontinuities that may suggest that covariates are
unbalanced on the two sides of the threshold. Moreover, for each variable, discon-
tinuities at the cut-off point were estimated. Appendix A2 shows that they cannot
be statistically distinguished from zero. For instance, the estimated discontinuity for
the variable taxable income is less than 2 percent and it is not significant.
Finally, as explained below, the inclusion of additional covariates did not signifi-
cantly change the estimated parameters, but reduced its standard errors. Hence, the
empirical evidence suggests that the identifying assumption holds.
22The statistic found is equal to -0.06 (implying a log discontinuity in the discontinuity of 6
percent) that is not significant (t-stat of -0.9).
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2.5.2 Discontinuity in the Probability of Treatment
I begin by estimating the discontinuity in the probability of receiving the tax
notification. Figure A.12, which takes the same form as those figures after it, shows
the probability of treatment on the vertical axis, and the running variable on the
horizontal axis. I use open circles to represent local averages of the dependent vari-
able, and solid lines to represent a flexible polynomial of the running variable fitted
using a bandwidth of one standard deviation around the selection threshold.23 The
order of the polynomial was selected among linear, quadratic and cubic orders, using
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as selection method.
The AIC was calculated as:
AIC = Nln(σˆ2) + 2p
where σˆ2 is the mean squared error of the corresponding regression model (equation
(1) or (2)), and p is the number of parameters in the regression. The selected order
of the polynomial is the one that produces the lowest AIC.
Table B.4 , like all tables following it, shows regression estimates for different
combinations of bandwidths and order polynomials. The preferred specifications
were selected using the AIC statistic (among linear, quadratic, and cubic orders)
for the reduced form models that include additional covariates. These regressions
include additional covariates because they help to improve precision and to reduce
small sample biases.
Figure A.12 shows that there is a large change in the probability of receiving the
tax notification at the selection threshold. Table B.4 shows the corresponding regres-
sion results obtained using equation (1) for different specifications. It confirms the
graphical evidence, and shows that the discontinuity in the probability of receiving
23The width of the bin used to calculate the local averages is 0.1 standard deviations. Similar
plots were obtained when using different widths.
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the treatment, or first stage, is around 75 percentage points. It is important to note
that the coefficients are very similar across specifications and all are significant at
the 1 percent level. As expected, the inclusion of additional covariates reduces the
standard errors of the estimates.
2.5.3 Effects on Compliance and Reported Taxes
To analyze the discontinuities in outcome variables, I use figures with the same
features as Figure A.12. The regression results in Tables B.5 through B.7 present
estimates for the intent-to-treat (ITT) and local average treatment effect (LATE).
The first outcome variable is used to study the effect of the enforcement method
on the probability of compliance (correcting or justifying the detected difference). It
is measured by a binary variable as explained in the previous section.
Figure A.13 shows that the probability of compliance changes significantly at
the selection threshold. Table B.5 shows the corresponding regression results. The
estimated discontinuity, or intent-to-treat effect, is around 50 percentage points,
while the LATE is approximately 67 percentage points. All the coefficients are
significant at the 1 percent level. The point estimates are robust across specifications,
and the inclusion of additional covariates does not significantly change them, but
reduces their standard errors. These findings imply that tax notifications are effective
in improving compliance.
To study the effect of the program on reported taxes, I use the post-treatment
ITA 2010. Figure A.14 shows that the estimated discontinuity for this variable seems
to be large. Table B.6 complements the graphical evidence with regression results.
The coefficients estimated in regressions that include additional covariates are larger,
but not significantly different, than those which do not. As expected, the standard
errors in the regressions that include covariates are smaller. The preferred estimates
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for the discontinuity range from around $1,000 to $1,400, and the effect adjusted
by the treatment discontinuity ranges from approximately $ 1,360 to $1,860. These
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.
There are 1,524 taxpayers in the dataset (around 3.8 percent) not reporting the
post-treatment ITA 2010, 51 of which received the tax notifications. The main
reason for attrition is that taxpayers stopped economic activities. This could be
problematic if the tax notification changes the probability of attrition and modifies
the composition of those remaining in the sample. For instance, assuming that the
tax notification increases the probability of attrition, if those getting out of business
would have had the smallest reported taxes had they remained, then my estimates
could overstate the impact of the notification.
To address this potential problem, I take two steps. First, I explicitly test whether
there is a discontinuity in the likelihood of attrition at the cut-off. Results presented
in Panel A of Table B.8 indicate that the LATE estimates are small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero, which suggests that attrition is unlikely to bias the
results.
In addition, I perform a bounding analysis similar to the one used by Lindo,
Sanders and Oreopoulos (2010), who adapted the trimming procedure suggested by
Lee (2009) to a regression discontinuity design using a bootstrap method.
Specifically, suppose that the tax notification increases the probability of attri-
tion, then I estimate the lower (upper) bound of the estimated impact assuming that
receiving the tax notification causes taxpayers to stop economic activities who would
have reported the least (most) if they had remained in business. Then, to make
groups to the both sides of the cut-off comparable, I drop the taxpayers with the
least (most) reported taxes from the units to the left of the selection threshold. I use
the estimated impact of the notification on the probability of attrition to calculate
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the share of taxpayers who needs to be trimmed out.24
Finally, I estimate the impact for this modified sample. Panel A of Table B.8
shows the LATE estimates (bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis) that corre-
spond to the preferred specification for each bandwidth. Both the lower and upper
bounds are statically indistinguishable from the RDD estimates. These findings sup-
port the hypothesis that attrition does not bias the estimated impact of the tax
notification.
2.5.4 Subsequent Effects
One advantage of my data is that they also enable me to test whether the effects
of this intervention change longer-term behavior as well. Using data on the reported
ITA corresponding to 2011, I analyze the effects of the treatment (tax notifications
sent in 2010) for the year following the intervention.
There is suggestive evidence that the effect of the treatment persists for the next
period. Figure A.15 shows that there is a discontinuity in reported ITA 2011 at the
selection threshold. Table B.7 presents the corresponding regression results. Most
of the estimates are not significant in the regressions without additional covariates.
On the other hand, the coefficients in the regressions with additional covariates are
significant at 1 percent or 5 percent level. The changes in the significance levels seem
to be driven by reduction in standard errors rather than by alterations in the point
estimates. The preferred estimates for the intent-to-treat effect range between $394
and $575, whereas the reweighted coefficients range from $506 to $ 768. Thus, the
evidence suggests persistence of the treatment effect, but in a reduced magnitude.
As for the ITA 2010, there is attrition for the reported ITA 2011. To rule out bias
24Following Lindo, Sanders and Oreopoulos (2010), in any bootstrap replication in which the
estimated change in the probability of attrition is negative, taxpayers with the highest (lowest)
reported taxes from the group to the right of the cut-off are dropped when estimating the lower
(upper) bound.
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caused by attrition, I follow the same steps used for the reported ITA 2010 in the
previous sub-section. Panel B of Table B.8 shows that there is no evidence of impact
of the tax notification on the probability of attrition. Moreover, the estimated upper
and lower bounds are both statistically indistinguishable from the RDD estimates.
These findings suggest that attrition does not bias the estimates of the impact of the
tax notification.
To better understand the mechanisms that explain the persistence of the tax no-
tifications effect, I use three variables. The first is an indicator for under-reporting
in 2011, as explained in Section 3. Figure A.16 shows that there is a discontinuous
reduction in the likelihood of under-reporting at the threshold point. Panel A of
Table B.9 complements the graphical evidence and shows regression estimates. In
particular, the coefficients in the preferred specifications reweighted by the discon-
tinuity on treatment probability range from -7.7 percent to -11.6 percent and are
significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. The regressions which do not con-
trol for additional covariates produced similar coefficients. The estimated effect can
be interpreted as the extensive margin deterrence effect for the year following the
enforcement program.
I also analyze an indicator for over-reporting in 2011. Figure A.17 shows that
the probability of over-reporting jumps up at the cut-off point. The corresponding
estimates in Panel B of Table B.9 appear to change moderately across the different
order polynomials and bandwidths. Nevertheless, there is suggestive evidence of
a small positive effect of the tax notifications on the probability of over-reporting.
Specifically, the LATE estimated for the preferred specifications are between 4.7
percent and 10.1 percent.
The estimated effect could be explained if taxpayers are willing to over-report in
an attempt to reduce the probability of being notified or audited (Andreoni, Erard
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and Feinstein, 1998). In the context of this article, those taxpayers who received the
tax notification in 2010 might expect a higher risk of being audited or being part
of an enforcement program than those who did not. This could happen if taxpayers
believe that the tax authority follows a conditional future audit rule in which past
non-compliers will be audited more frequently in the future (Alm, Cronshaw and
McKee, 1993). Hence, some of them over-report to reduce the probability of these
undesirable events.
The three previous results imply the absence of the “bomb crater effect” intro-
duced by Guala and Mittone (2005) and Mittone (2006). 25 The authors found in
experimental settings that after an audit, evasion remained high for a few rounds and
then decreased. If audits rules are believed to be random, the “bomb crater effect”
can be explained by the “gambler’s fallacy effect” (misperception of probabilities).
In this case, the assumption that a random audit is less likely to occur because it
recently happened (Kirchler, 2007).
In the context of this study, the absence of the “bomb crater effect” in the results
can be explained by the perception of endogenous audit rules such as the conditional
future audit rule described above or because of the absence of the “gambler’s fallacy
effect”.
The last outcome variable is the difference between the under-reported amount in
2011 and 2010, as defined in Section 3. On average, this variable is negative (taxpay-
ers under-reported less in 2011 with respect to 2010). Interestingly, that gap jumps
discontinuously at the cut-off point (Figure A.18). Table B.9 presents the regression
results, which appear to change to some extent across specifications. Nonetheless,
there seems to be evidence of a negative effect on the outcome variable. The coeffi-
25The authors derived this term from the First World War: troops under enemy fire hid in craters
of recent explosions because they believed it to be very improbable that two bombs will fall precisely
in the same crater in a short period of time.
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cients for the LATE estimated in preferred regressions are between -$1,041 and -$476.
One of them is not significant at the 10 percent level (0.5 std. dev. bandwidth) and
the other two are significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. These estimates
are close to those obtained from regressions without additional covariates.
If taxpayers believe that the probability of getting a notification is an increas-
ing function of the under-reported amount, then these findings suggest that some
taxpayers strategically attempt to evade taxes while trying to avoid being notified.
As pointed out by Phillips (2014), it is reasonable to think that taxpayers do
not face a constant likelihood of non-compliance detection. Instead, that probabil-
ity most likely depends on how large non-compliance is. This arises from targeted
compliance enforcement methods that focus on taxpayers who are most likely to be
non-compliers and to those who have the greater expected non-compliance amount.
Especially interesting is the cut-off rule studied by Alm, Cronshaw and McKee
(1993) using a laboratory experiment. Under this rule, the tax authority announces
that any taxpayer who reports less than the cut-off level will be audited with cer-
tainty.
As explained before, the enforcement method studied in this paper follows a cut-
off rule; however, taxpayers do not know the cut-off. Hence, is it reasonable to believe
that taxpayers who received the tax notification in 2010 think that they were treated
because they under-reported “too much”. Following that logic, those taxpayers who
wanted to under-report in 2011, and received the tax notification in 2010, would
reduce the under-reported amount significantly, expecting to fall below the selection
threshold and consequently avoid being notified in 2011. In other words, taxpayers
perceive enforcement to be a function of compliance behavior. The results in panel
C of Table B.9 suggest that kind of behavior.
In summary, the findings in this subsection suggest that the treatment changed
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taxpayers’ behavior one year following the intervention. Treated taxpayers were
more likely to over-report and less likely to under-report. Also, treated taxpayers
who under-reported in 2011, under-reported an amount significantly lower than in
2010, presumably to avoid being notified.
Collectively, these results suggest that some taxpayers perceive enforcement to be
endogenously determined as a function of compliance, and act accordingly to reduce
the tax burden and/or the probability of being targeted for enforcement. That
behavior is consistent with theories that explain tax evasion with economics-of-crime
type of models, first introduced to the tax compliance literature by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972).
2.6 Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of tax notifications on compliance and tax rev-
enues in Ecuador. I overcome confounding factors by using a regression discontinuity
design that takes advantage of a discrete increase in the probability of receiving a
non-compliance notification. The results indicate that the intervention causes the
probability of compliance to increase by around 67 percentage points. Also, the
treatment causes taxes reported to increase by approximately $1,400
I also find suggestive evidence that the effect of the intervention persists. Around
the cut-off, treated taxpayers reported more taxes in the year following the interven-
tion (2011) than the non-treated group.
In addition, those receiving the treatment were less likely to under-report, which
can be interpreted as the deterrence effect of the intervention. Moreover, the tax
notification caused an increase in the probability to over-report, which can be ex-
plained if some taxpayers pay more taxes than what is due in an attempt to reduce
the probability of being notified or audited.
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Additional results show that on average, taxpayers under-reported less in 2011
than in 2010, and that the gap was greater for treated taxpayers around the cut-off.
If taxpayers believe that the probability of receiving a notification is an increasing
function of the under-reported amount, then these findings imply that some taxpayers
strategically attempt to evade taxes while trying to avoid being notified.
These results suggest that some taxpayers believe that enforcement is a function
of compliance, and act strategically to reduce the tax burden and/or the probability
of being targeted for enforcement. That behavior is consistent with theories that
explain tax evasion with economics-of-crime type of models.
These findings indicate that inexpensive tax compliance interventions can be used
effectively by tax authorities in low-income countries. This is important since tax
evasion is a particularly large problem in these countries, and since they likely have
less means and capability to pursue other, costlier, compliance strategies. Thus,
while it is difficult to know the extent to which the results found in his paper extend
to countries with different tax systems, the results suggest that there may well be
scope for low-income countries to reduce the inefficiencies and inequities caused by
tax evasion by utilizing low-cost compliance strategies such as the one studied in this
paper.
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3. PRICE SALIENCE AND SOCIAL COMPARISONS AS POLICY
INSTRUMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN ENERGY
USAGE
3.1 Introduction
Energy conservation has become a significant matter in public policy in recent
years, mainly because of the volatile production costs and increasing climate change
concerns. Consequently, it is important to understand the effects of policy instru-
ments aimed to reduce electricity consumption. Traditionally, economic or price mea-
sures have been considered the first-best policies to address this issue. In that sense,
policymakers often use non-linear financial incentives in order to induce individuals
to change behavior as part of energy and social policy. For example, electric, natural
gas, and water utilities generally set tariffs that are a non-linear function of consump-
tion. The marginal price of one additional unit of consumption discretely rises at
specific levels of consumption. Likewise in social policy, the retirement benefits from
Social Security discretely rise at certain ages of retirement. Also, discrete changes
in the marginal income tax induced by the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) could
cause lower income households to work more hours. The policy motivation behind
such non-linear schemes is that the discrete change in marginal incentives will induce
individuals to change behavior.
However, there is mixed evidence that these non-linear incentives alter behavior
in the energy sector. (e.g. see Reiss and White (2005), Borenstein (2009, 2012),
and Wolak (2011), Ito (2014)). Several explanations exist for the limited behavioral
response. Individuals may be unaware of the non-linear incentives or face choice
frictions that prevent them from changing behavior. Alternatively, even after ac-
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counting for optimization frictions, individuals may be inelastic with respect to the
incentive. Some existing field experiments have used information interventions to
make the non-linear incentives more salient in a variety of domains. 1
In contrast, recent research has shown that non-pecuniary strategies can be used
to influence behavior in a variety of areas.2 Social comparisons have been particularly
effective to encourage environmental conservation. (e.g. see Schultz et al. (2007),
Nolan et al. (2008), Allcott (2011b), Ferraro and Price (2013), and Costa and Kahn
(2013)).
These non-pecuniary strategies to induce conservation are actually frequently
used by policymakers. In the energy domain, the use of social comparisons is in-
creasingly seen as a powerful policy instrument. The alternative policy instrument –
prices – can face large political constraints. Policymakers and regulators are generally
reluctant to set prices at the true marginal social cost for utilities such as electric-
ity, water, and natural gas. In fact, in many developing countries energy prices are
set far below the market price, and such government subsidy schemes contribute to
government debt. In Ecuador for instance, the electricity subsidies accounted for ap-
proximately 2% of the public sector expenses in 2010. According to the Ecuadorian
Ministry Coordinator of Production, Employment and Competitiveness (MCPEC),
the cost of electricity to consumers would increase around 27% if these subsidies
were removed (MCPEC, 2010). In that context, an important question is whether
information interventions can be used in developing countries to induce conservation
of energy, and therefore reduce funds allocated to subsidies.
Despite the growing research on the effects of both non-linear incentives and so-
1These field experiments present a mixed record on the ability of salience interventions to change
behavior (e.g. see Liebman and Luttmer (2011), Chetty and Saez (2013), Kahn and Wolak (2013),
and Jessoe and Rapson (2014)).
2For instance, retirement savings, (Duflo and Saez, 2003), coordination games (Eckel and Wilson,
2007), provision of public goods (Harper, Konstan and Li, 2010), and charitable giving (Meer, 2011).
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cial comparisons on conservation, little is known about the relative efficacy of these
instruments.3 In that context, the main goal of this paper is to identify the rela-
tive magnitudes of these two incentives in a developing country. To reach this goal,
we partnered with the Quito Electric Company (Empresa Ele´ctrica Quito-EEQ) to
implement a large scale randomized controlled trial. In our field experiment, infor-
mational letters were attached to the electricity bills of randomly selected households
in March 2014. To our knowledge, this is the first field experiment in the energy sec-
tor that jointly studies non-linear incentives and social comparisons in an effort to
estimate their relative effects.
Substantial price variability is important to test for the effects of pecuniary in-
centives on conservation. Typically it is very difficult to find utilities that have large
changes in tariffs for small changes in consumption. However, households in Ecuador,
and in Quito in particular, face a tariff with large changes in the total electricity bill
for an additional kWh of monthly consumption (i.e. notches). These notches do not
appear to induce a consumption reduction because we find no evidence of disconti-
nuity of the distribution before the notches or bunching around them in historical
consumption data. This might be evidence of the lack of salience of the complex
electricity tariff in Quito. Since it has been shown that salience is an important
determinant of economic decisions (Finkelstein, 2009; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009;
Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009), and since random assignment of prices in real mar-
kets is most likely impractical, then making the notches salient is an ideal exercise
to test for the effects of non-linear price schedules on conservation.
In our randomized controlled trial we explore the effects of three information
3 An important contribution is Reiss and White (2008). Using longitudinal data from the
2000-2001 California electricity crisis, the authors find significant demand responses to a large and
unanticipated price shock, and a voluntary conservation campaign. However, the paper does not
offer an elaborate discussion on the relative efficacy and recognizes the necessity of further research
on the matter.
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interventions. The first treatment makes the most important notch (the 111th kWh
consumed increases the total electricity bill by around 40%) salient. The second
makes a social comparison. Finally, we use the two pieces of information together as
a third treatment to test for additive effects.
For the households with historical consumption above the notch, we find that the
social comparison treatment reduces consumption by approximately 1.36 kWh/month
(around 1%), and it is significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the price
salience treatment estimate is approximately one third of that of the social com-
parison, and it is not statistically significant at standard levels. However, we also
find suggestive evidence that the effect of the price salience treatment exists only for
households who were just above the notch, whereas the effect of the social compari-
son is significant for both households who were just above and well above the notch.
These heterogeneous effects for the price notch salience treatment might explain its
relatively small overall treatment effect.
The estimate for the treatment that combines price salience and social compar-
ison information falls between the other two estimates and is not significant. The
relatively small effect of it suggests that the price salience information does not
strengthen the impact of the social comparison, and might even weaken it. This
could be explained if the extra information reduces the probability that the cus-
tomer reads and understands the message. Importantly, we find that none of the
treatments have a significant effect for households historically consuming below the
notch. Hence, we find no evidence of a “boomerang” effect created by the infor-
mation intervention. Also, and consistent with previous literature, we find that the
effect of our interventions diminishes over time.
We believe that these results contribute to the understanding of the capacity of
information interventions to promote conservation of energy in the context of a de-
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veloping country. The larger effect of the social comparison treatment suggests that
similar interventions could be used in longer term projects to induce conservation
and reduce the fiscal burden of electricity subsidies. Our findings for the price notch
salience treatment support previous literature finding that non-linear price incentives
are not effective in reducing consumption of electricity. However, our results also sug-
gest that information that makes salient non-linear price schemes might be effective
if targeted to the population with consumption levels just above price notches.
3.2 Institutional Background
The Quito Electric Company serves approximately 750,000 residential costumers,
65% of which are located in the Metropolitan District of Quito; the rest belong to
nearby cantones (political classification similar to counties in the U.S). Table B.10
shows summary statistics for the Metropolitan District of Quito corresponding to
2013. Consumption is relatively low and steady across months, with the average
ranging between 137 and 153 kWh, and the median between 123 and 130 kWh.
This is likely due to the moderate climate that shows small variability in tem-
perature throughout the year.4 The absence of extremely hot or cold temperatures
implies that households generally do not use air conditioners or heaters, and that
the main electricity usage comes from refrigerators, televisions and lightning (Table
B.11).
Electricity meters are read approximately monthly according to a schedule estab-
lished at the beginning of the year, and bills are delivered by special courier around
one week after the readings.
4The average monthly temperature in Quito in 2011 ranged from 57 ◦F and 60 ◦F (Inamhi,
2013).
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3.2.1 Electricity Tariff in Quito
The electricity tariff in Quito follows an increasing-block tariff (IBT) pricing
structure which is nowadays the standard price policy of local utilities both in de-
veloped and developing countries. An IBT pricing schedule exhibits an increasing
marginal cost per kWh that increases with the monthly electricity consumption level;
it is a step function where height is defined by the marginal price and length by the
range of consumption that the marginal price applies to. Absent subsidies and other
charges, this price schedule would resemble a typical schedule faced by households
in the United States.
However, the residential electricity tariff in Quito includes additional charges
and subsidies that produce considerable changes in the cost of electricity at certain
levels of consumption.5 For instance, households consuming at or below 110 kWh per
month pay approximately $8.5 per month, and those consuming 111 kWh pay around
$12 per month. In other words, increasing consumption by less than 1% implies a
change in their monthly electricity bill of approximately 40%. The potential savings
are approximately equivalent to 0.5% of the median monthly household income in
Ecuador. This notch is due to reduced marginal price, fixed fee and waste disposal
fee that are part of the subsidy called “Tarifa de la Dignidad” (Dignity Tariff).6
Figure A.19 graphs the total bill as a function of monthly consumption level. As can
be seen from the graph, the largest discontinuity in total expenditures is precisely at
111 kWh. Notice also from Figure A.19 that there are two additional discontinuities
5The described values correspond to December 2013. The value of the subsidies change each
month due to the varying amount of the cross subsidy, which is collected from household with
consumption above 160 kWh in a given month (10% surcharge) and distributed to households with
consumption below 130 kWh in the following month.
6The tariff also includes mandatory contributions for public lighting and Fire Department equal
to 9.5% of total electricity expenditure before subsidies, and to a fixed fee of $1.59, respectively.
Finally, there is a waste disposal fee composed of a flat fee and a charge proportional to the electricity
consumption level.
34
in the total bill: at 131 and 161 kWh, although these are less prominent that the
one at 111 kWh.
3.2.2 Pre-treatment Distribution of Consumption
The large changes in the cost of electricity do not appear to induce a consumption
reduction because we find no evidence of discontinuity of the distribution before the
notches, or bunching around them, in historical consumption data. Figure A.20 plots
the distribution of consumption corresponding to December 2013. Notice that the
plotted density appears to be smooth across the 111th notch. Also, following the
procedure proposed by McCrary (2008), we estimate the discontinuity in the density
at the 111th threshold, and find that it is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Similar results were obtained for the other months and the other two
notches.
The lack of evidence of discontinuities in the density before the notches might
be explained by the imperfect control that households have on the consumption of
electricity (frictions), which makes it difficult to adjust consumption just below a
given level. For example, households usually do not have real time information on
their consumption. It is also very likely that they do not have complete knowledge
on the energy use of different appliances. It could also be explained by an inelastic
response to the price schedule. However, if consumers were totally aware of how the
tariff works, and willing to reduce consumption in an effort to take advantages of
the subsidies, it would be reasonable to expect bunching in the distribution around
the notches. We explore this option by using method proposed in Chetty, Fried-
man, Olsen and Pistaferri (2011) to estimate if there is bunching around the most
important notch. Figure A.21 plots frequencies along with the estimated density
corresponding to December 2013. There is no graphical evidence of bunching around
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the notch.
The fact that the modal point of the distribution is close the 111th notch might
suggest that the non-linear price scheme moved the distribution from a higher level
of consumption, implying that individuals are aware of the subsidy. This does not
seems to be the case since the distribution of consumption corresponding to December
2006 (six months before the creation of the subsidy) is very similar to the one in 2013
(Figure A.22).7
3.3 Conceptual Framework
Standard economic theory predicts that consumption is a function of prices. In
particular, the central assumption is that individuals optimize with marginal price,
and hence changes on it should bring about changes in the quantity demanded. In
this sense policymakers often use non-linear financial incentives in order to induce
individuals to change behavior as part of energy policy. The policy motivation behind
such non-linear schemes is that the discrete change in marginal incentives will induce
individuals to change behavior.
However, there is mixed evidence that these non-linear incentives alter behavior
in the energy sector. (e.g. see Reiss and White (2005), Borenstein (2009, 2012),
and Wolak (2011), Ito (2014)). Several explanations exist for the limited behavioral
response. Individuals may be unaware of the non-linear incentives or face choice fric-
tions that prevent them from changing behavior. Alternatively, even after accounting
for optimization frictions, individuals may be inelastic with respect to the incentive.
In this context, the use of information interventions, becomes an alternative to induce
conservation of electricity.8
7The distribution of consumption corresponding to other months before the creation of the
subsidy is very similar to the one in Figure A.22.
8This is considered in Jessoe and Rapson (2014). Using a randomized controlled trial they find
that high-frequency information about residential electricity usage significantly increases the price
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We want to emphasize that our paper does not speak to the size of optimization
frictions and the structural price elasticity of electricity, but only to the relative
magnitude of the information interventions included in our design.
3.3.1 Information on Prices
In a system of non-linear pricing, consumers might not be aware of the how the
tariff works, or might have incomplete knowledge on how much can be saved if they
reduce consumption up to a certain level. Hence, information that explains how
the tariff works can be used as an incentive to induce conservation. It has been
shown that salience is an important determinant of economic decisions (Finkelstein,
2009; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). If prices are
not salient consumers may not be able to fully optimize. Moreover, there may be a
cognitive cost of understanding complex pricing schedules. Therefore, information
about how the electricity tariff works, given in a simple way, is likely to be welfare
improving.9
In the context of consumers in Quito, we have good reasons to think that the
electricity tariff is not salient. First, the electricity bill includes the monthly con-
sumption, subsidies (if any), other charges, and the total due. However, there is no
specific information regarding how the non-linear tariff works. In particular, there
is no information on how the price changes at the certain levels, due to subsidies
(see Figure A.23). 10 Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, we find no evi-
dence of discontinuity in the distribution of consumers before the notches or bunching
elasticity of demand.
9The impact of the provision of simplified information has been explored in a variety of domains
such as retirement plan decisions (Duflo and Saez, 2003); labor supply response to the income tax
rates Chetty and Saez (2013); government transfer programs take-up rates (Bhargava and Manoli,
2013).
10Detailed information about the electricity tariff relevant for each month is available in the
website of EEQ (www.eeq.gov).
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around them that may suggest that the notches induce conservation of electricity.
Then, the use of price salience is an ideal (indirect) way to test for the effects of
non-linear price schemes on conservation of electricity.
3.3.2 Social Comparisons
Recent literature has found evidence on the important impact that non-price
incentives can have on conservation. Social comparisons have been particularly ef-
fective to encourage environmental conservation (Schultz et al., 2007; Nolan et al.,
2008; Allcott, 2011a; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
Two mechanisms could drive the behavioral response to social comparisons. House-
holds with incomplete information about their house’s production of energy services
may gain private information on the optimal level of consumption (Becker, 1965).
Alternatively, households may be responding to social norms that affect their moral
payoffs (Levitt and List, 2007). If consumers bear a moral cost from energy consump-
tion (derived from environmental concerns, for instance), and if we assume that this
utility depends on the beliefs about the “social norm”, then social comparisons could
change the moral cost of consumption.
It is important to mention that our experiment does not try to disentangle the
effects of these two mechanisms, but, as stated before, aims to measure the impact
of the social comparisons relative information about the tariff schedule in a common
setting.
3.4 Research Design
Our field experiment focuses on households with historical consumption around
the 111th notch in the metropolitan area of Quito. In particular, it targets the
approximately 64,000 residential customers with monthly average consumption be-
tween 100 and 125 kWh in 2013. We have selected this group because they are more
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likely to respond to information regarding the 111 kWh notch. The experiment was
designed within the conceptual framework introduced above, and consists of an “in-
formational nudge” where randomly selected households receive, attached to their
monthly electricity bill in March 2014, additional information regarding three dif-
ferent treatments: (1) price salience, (2) social comparison, and (3) both together.
A fourth group receives no informational flyer and serves as the control group. The
households in our sample were equally split among these groups as can be seen in
Table B.12. We randomize treatment within the 74 sectors and 24 urban parishes
in which EEQ divides the metropolitan area. We do this to to guarantee that there
are no systematic differences across geographic areas.
The first treatment group receives a flyer that informs the customer of their av-
erage consumption in 2013, the size of the price notch and the effect of the notch on
their monthly bill. Specifically, the customers receive information on how much they
would save (pay additionally) if they reduce (increase) their monthly consumption
just below (above) the 111th notch. For example, a household with average con-
sumption of 115 kWh/month is told how much approximately the monthly bill falls
if consumption is reduced to 110 kWh. In addition, the flyer suggests several energy
saving tips to reduce consumption.
A second treatment group receives an information intervention that makes a
social comparison between the household and other households around 110 kWh.
For example, a household with average consumption of 115 kWh is informed that
“an average household like you” consumes approximately 110 kWh and that the
household averages 115 kWh. Since our data show that the historical distribution
of consumptions has its modal value close to the most important notch, we exploit
this fact to use the 110 kWh level as a reference point in this treatment. We use this
feature to safely compare the effect of the two information interventions as they target
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the same population and use the same reference point. As with the first treatment,
the flyer in the second treatment offers several energy saving tips. Importantly, the
flyer for the second treatment group makes no mention of the price notch.
To test for interactive effects between the two treatments, a third treatment
combines each of the two information treatments by informing customers of the
price notch and making a social comparison. Figures A.24 trough A.29 show sample
letters of the three treatments in Spanish with the corresponding translations to
English.
In the results section presented below, we separately analyze the effect on con-
sumption for households who historically consumed above and below 110 kWh. For
households who historically averaged between 111-125 kWh, each treatment is pre-
dicted to reduce consumption. In the case of households receiving the price salience
treatment, the information intervention informs households of notable dollar savings
if consumption is reduced. This information could be useful to consumers unaware of
the price notch, or to reduce the cognitive burden to calculate the potential savings
of conservation to those who had imperfect knowledge about it. In the case of the so-
cial comparison treatment, and as explained in the previous section, the information
could be used by households to learn about the optimal level of consumption, and
also to increase the moral cost of consumption. Therefore, we expect that higher-
than-average consumers respond to such information by reducing consumption.
For households who historically averaged between 100-109 kWh, the treatments
could increase or decrease consumption. Households receiving the price salience
treatment could react by reducing consumption to reduce the possibility of cross-
ing the 111th threshold, which would increase their payments by several dollars.
However, their consumption could increase if households believe they could increase
consumption without crossing the threshold. In the case of the social comparison
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treatment, households consuming below the reference, could adjust its beliefs about
the optimal level of consumption and also increase consumption, or they could try to
reduce consumption to avoid the likelihood of becoming a higher-than-average con-
sumer. Naturally, for all treatments it is likely that some proportion of consumers
do not read the information or just ignore it.
3.5 Results
As a first step we show that the four groups we have considered are balanced
with respect to average consumption corresponding to 2013. This holds for the
complete sample of households and for the samples split above and below the 111
kWh notch. The three panels of Table B.12 show that the average, median and
standard deviation of consumption is very similar across treatments. Additionally,
Table B.13 shows estimates of the differences in average consumption across groups.
For all the pairwise comparisons the differences are less than 0.01% and none of them
are significant at the 10% level.
In our estimations the dependent variable is a “month” of consumption, which is
the average daily consumption during the meter-read window multiplied by 365/12.
We first consider the effects for the three months after the intervention (i.e. April-
June, 2014). Following the conceptual framework described above, we separately
analyze households with historical consumption above and below the notch.
3.5.1 Treatment Effects for Households Historically above the Notch
Table B.14 shows the estimated average treatment effects corresponding to house-
holds who historically consumed above the notch. In the first specification we con-
sider a cross sectional estimation that includes only post-intervention observations
with year-by-month fixed effects. We find that the social comparison treatment re-
duces consumption by approximately 1.36 kWh/month (around 1%), and it is signif-
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icant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the price notch salience treatment estimate
is approximately one third of that of the social comparison, and it is not statistically
significant at standard levels. The coefficient for the treatment that combines the
two pieces of information falls between the other two estimates and is not significant.
To increase the precision of our estimations we add pre-intervention consumption
to the basic specification. Specifically, we include monthly consumption for the
same quarter in the year previous to the experiment (i.e. April-June, 2013), and
consumption corresponding to the two months before the intervention (i.e. January-
February, 2014). These latter variables are used to capture any changes in household
consumption patterns after 2013 but before the intervention. The coefficients for
this specification are very similar to the basic one. The only noticeable difference is
in the coefficient for the treatment that combines the two information interventions,
which is slightly bigger and significant at the 10%.
We take advantage of the panel nature of our data and use information on con-
sumption of electricity ranging from February, 2012 to June, 2014 in our last two
specifications. The specification in column three is a standard difference-in-difference
estimation, whereas the next specification uses both year-by-month and household
fixed effects. The estimates for these specifications are very similar to the previous
ones.
The effect we find for the social comparison treatment is around half the size
of OPOWER Home Energy Reports utilized in the U.S., but it still suggests that
low-cost information interventions can induce energy conservation. The relatively
small effect of the third treatment suggests that the price salience information does
not strengthen the impact of the social comparison, and might even weaken it. This
could be explained if the extra information reduces the probability that the customer
reads and understands the message.
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The non-significant effect we find for the price notch salience treatment is some-
what surprising. This could be due to the frictions mentioned before, which prevent
households from optimizing consumption, or because customers did not actually read
the messages. Even though we believe these two explanations are reasonable, the
fact that we find significant effects for the first treatment implies that at least a small
proportion of households read the flyers, and that some were able to successfully re-
duce consumption, despite the frictions. Another possibility for the lack of response
to the price notch treatment is the relatively small impact that non-linear incentives
have on behavior in the energy sector (Reiss and White (2005), Borenstein (2009,
2012), and Wolak (2011), Ito (2014)). Alternatively, the small size of the subsidy
relative household income (around 0.5% of the median monthly household income)
could explain the absence of a significant effect.
Our finding could also be explained by heterogeneous effects. In particular, those
households whose consumption falls relatively far from the notch might be less likely
to alter behavior than those with consumption close to it. This is because it is more
difficult for the former group to reduce consumption to take advantage of the subsidy.
To explore this option, we divide the sample into households who were just above
the notch (averaging 111-115 kWh/month), and households that were well above
the notch (averaging 116-125 kWh/month). Results are presented in Table B.15,
which has the same specifications considered in Table B.14. For the latter group, the
price notch treatment had no statistically significant effect on consumption. On the
other hand, we find suggestive evidence that this treatment induced conservation
for households who were just above the notch. Unfortunately, our estimates are
imprecise and only the one in the second specification is significant at the 10% level
and has a size similar to the corresponding to the social comparison treatment. These
findings imply that a considerable effect of the price salience treatment for households
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who historically consumed just above the notch cannot be ruled out.
In contrast, Table B.15 shows that the effect of the social comparison treatment is
similar for households who historically were several kilowatt hours above the notch
and for those who were just above it. This suggests that the effect of the social
comparison is significant across the consumption distribution, whereas the effect of
the price notch information exists only for those who were just above the notch.
3.5.2 Treatment Effects for Households Historically below the Notch
Importantly, we find that none of the treatments have a significant effect for
households historically consuming below the notch. Table B.16, which considers the
same specifications in the two previous tables, shows that all the estimates across
treatments and specifications are not significant. Hence, we find no evidence of a
non-desirable “boomerang” effect created by the information intervention.
3.5.3 Impermanence of Effects
Recent empirical evidence suggests that non-pecuniary incentives only hold in the
short term (See for instance, Gneezy and List (2006), Landry et al. (2010), Ferraro
and Price (2013)). As pointed out by Gneezy and List (2006), this could be explained
if these incentives have the greatest impact shortly after the intervention, when they
activate moral sentiments. However, they disappear over time as the decision maker
forgets about the intervention.
We test for this in our experiment by estimating separate treatment effects for
the three quarters after the intervention for the sample of households with historical
consumption above the notch. We do this by interacting indicators for each quarter
with indicators for our treatments in the panel framework used in the fourth spec-
ification of the results tables. The results are shown in Table B.17. Our findings
are consistent with previous literature in that the treatment effects are diminishing
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over time. The coefficients corresponding to the second and third quarters after the
interventions are smaller than those corresponding to the first. In the case of the
social comparison intervention, the estimates corresponding to the second and third
quarters are no longer significant at standard levels.
3.6 Conclusions
The second essay uses a large-scale field experiment to analyze the role of infor-
mation interventions as policy instruments to induce conservation of electricity. A
unique feature of the electricity tariff in Quito, Ecuador is used to make salient a
sizable price notch that apparently had not historically induced consumption reduc-
tion. The experiment also explores the effect of social norms to promote conservation
of electricity.
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the relative magnitudes
of these two information interventions in a common setting. Specifically, our design
uses the mentioned notch as a reference point for both interventions and targets the
same population.
Results are consistent with recent literature finding that social comparisons are
effective to encourage environmental conservation. They show that consumers his-
torically consuming above the notch respond to the social comparison by reducing
consumption by approximately 1%. The size of this effect is around half the size
of OPOWER Home Energy Reports utilized in the U.S., but the size we find still
suggests that low-cost information interventions can induce energy conservation.
On the other hand, the estimate for the price notch salience is approximately one
third of that of the social comparison, and it is not statistically significant at standard
levels. The lack of response to this treatment could be explained by frictions that do
not allow households to adjust consumption, or because most customers did not read
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the messages. Given the sizable effect of the social comparison treatment, it must be
the case that at least a small proportion of targeted customers read the messages and
were able to successfully reduce consumption. Hence, the findings imply that the
social comparison treatment was indeed more effective in promoting conservation.
However, there is also find suggestive evidence that the effect of the price salience
treatment exists only for households who were just above the notch, whereas the
effect of the social comparison is significant for both households who were just above
and well above the notch. These heterogeneous effects for the price notch salience
treatment might explain its relatively small overall treatment effect.
The experiments also explores the effect of a third treatment that combines the
price notch and social comparison information. Results show that the effect of this
treatment falls between the other two. This suggests that the price salience infor-
mation does not strengthen the impact of the social comparison, and might even
weaken it. This could be explained if the extra information reduces the probability
that the targeted customer reads and understands the message.
Results also show that none of the treatments have a significant effect for house-
holds historically consuming below the notch. Hence, we find no evidence of a non-
desirable “boomerang” effect that increases consumption. Also, and consistent with
previous literature, we find that the effect of the social comparison intervention di-
minishes over time.
We believe that these results contribute to the understanding of the capacity of
information interventions to encourage conservation of energy in the context of a de-
veloping country. The larger effect of the social comparison treatment suggests that
similar interventions could be used in longer term projects to promote conservation
and reduce the fiscal burden of electricity subsidies. Our findings for the price notch
salience treatment support previous literature finding that non-linear price incentives
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are not effective in reducing consumption of electricity. However, our results also sug-
gest that information that makes salient non-linear price schemes might be effective
if targeted to the population with consumption levels just above price notches.
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4. THE IMPACT OF THE ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW (SB 1070) ON THE
PROPORTION OF THE NONCITIZEN HISPANIC STATE POPULATION
4.1 Introduction
Immigration legislation and its consequences are among the most important topics
in the public policy debates in the U.S. In recent years a series of measures at the
federal and state level have modified the immigration system. These actions have
attracted the attention of researchers trying to assess their effects. 1
In that context, the main objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of state
immigration legislation on the stock of undocumented population. To reach this goal,
I study the Arizona Senate Bill 1070 enacted in 2010 (SB 1070), which is arguably
one of the most strict state immigration bills passed in recent years. In particular,
Arizona was the first state to enact a law that mandates law enforcement personnel
to inquire about the immigration status of individuals suspected to be illegal aliens,
and detain those who fail to show proper documentation. It also makes it a crime for
an unauthorized individual to apply for or hold a job in Arizona. In other words, this
law increases the expected costs and risk of being an illegal immigrant in Arizona.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the passage of this law caused a reduction in the
Hispanic population in Arizona, with churches, schools, businesses, and health care
facilities reporting drops in the number of Hispanic users.2 Clearly, these reports do
not imply a causal relation and could be misleading. Instead of relying on information
not statistically representative, I estimate the effect of this law on the composition
of the population Arizona, specifically, in the proportion of noncitizen Hispanics
1See for instance, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999); Da´vila, Paga´n and Soydemir (2002); Hanson,
Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002); Gathmann (2008); Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012); Good
(2013).
2Goldberg (2010), Gomez (2010)
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living in that state. In order to get a consistent estimate of this effect, I use state-
level aggregate data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the synthetic
control method proposed in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) to calculate
a counterfactual for Arizona.
In that sense this paper follows closely Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2014).
The authors estimate the impact of the Arizona’s 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act
(LAWA) using synthetic control methods, and find that this law caused a notable
decline in the share of the Hispanic noncitizen population in Arizona.
The use of SB 1070 has one important advantage over the use of LAWA. The latter
aimed to reduce the “demand” of undocumented workers by requiring employers to
verify the identity of new employees using the federal E-verify system. On the other
hand, SB 1070 targeted undocumented individuals directly, therefore not only making
it more difficult to find a job, but also more risky to reside in Arizona. This feature
offers a wider perspective to study state-level legislation, by allowing the estimation
of its impact on the labor supply not included in the formal sector, and also on the
population not looking for a job.
This paper is also related to Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2014), which studies
to effect of SB 1070 on the flow of immigrants from Mexico. The paper finds that
passage of the Arizona Immigration Law reduced the flow of undocumented immi-
grants from Mexico to Arizona by 30 to 70 percent. Another closely related paper
is Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2015). The authors use synthetic control methods
to estimate the effect of SB 1070 on the proportion of noncitizen Hispanics in Ari-
zona and find that the effect of the law since it was passed until 2013 was minimal;
however, the paper does not consider short term effects.
One contribution of this paper is that it assess the flexibility of the illegal pop-
ulation to move as a response to changing conditions. Shortly after the law was
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passed, on April 23, 2010, lawsuits were filed against it, and before it went into
effect, on July 29, the most controversial parts of the law were blocked by a U.S.
District Court. Moreover, in April 2011, the United States Court of Appeals upheld
the district court’s decision. However, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in 2012 parts
of the original law, including the one mandating, if there is reasonable suspicion,
police officers to inquire the immigration status of individuals suspected to be in the
country illegally. These events allow the estimation of the short-term effects of this
state legislation given its changing implications. In that sense, this paper joins the
small, but growing literature, studying the response of undocumented individuals to
unfavorable conditions (See for instance, Cadena and Kovak (2013), Watson (2013)).
Results indicate that the Arizona Immigration Law produced a statistically sig-
nificant decline in the share of noncitizen Hispanics in Arizona between 10% and
16%. However, this effect lasted less than one year, as the evidence suggests that it
vanishes after a few months.
4.2 Institutional Background
Arizona has historically passed legislation aimed at restricting illegal immigration.
For instance, under a 1996 Arizona law, driver’s licenses are available only to citizens
or those who prove legal presence in the country. In 2004 the Arizona Proposition
200 was passed requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote, voter identification
at the polling place, and verification of immigration status of applicants of non-
federally mandated public benefits. In 2007 the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)
was enacted, which mandated all Arizona employers to use the E-Verify system
during the employment process to assess the legal eligibility of new employees. In
fact, laws similar to SB1070 were approved by the Arizona state legislature in 2006
and 2008, but were vetoed by the Governor.
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The passage of SB 1070 on April 23, 2010 received significant attention by the
media nationwide, which included live broadcasting of the Governor signing the bill.
This law was qualified as the nation’s toughest bill, and caused immediate reaction
for and against it.3
In general terms SB 1070 implies that immigration offenses in Arizona are not
only violations of federal laws, but are also state crimes. Specifically, it makes it
illegal for an unauthorized individual to apply for or hold a job in Arizona. It
also imposes penalties on those transporting, sheltering or hiring undocumented
individuals. But the most controversial part of the bill is the so called “show me
your papers” provision. This clause requires law enforcement personnel to inquire
about the immigration status of those they reasonably suspect are in the country
illegally, and to detain those who fail to show proper documentation.
This law was scheduled to go into effect on July 29, 2010. However, just one week
after it was signed, it was modified by the Arizona House Bill 2162 (HB 2162). The
changes were a response to critics stating that the law encouraged “racial profiling”.
The main modification indicates that prosecutors would not investigate immigration
status based on race, color or national origin. Another adjustment says that law
enforcement personnel may only inquire immigration status of those they stop, detain
or arrest.
Despite of those modifications, this immigration bill faced several legal challenges,
including one filed by the United States Department of Justice. In response to this
lawsuit, a U.S. District Judge issued a preliminary injunction on July 28, 2010 that
blocked temporally the “show me your papers” provision . Therefore, the enforce-
ment of SB 1070, did not initially include this clause. The decision of the U.S.
District was upheld on April 11, 2011 by the Ninth Circuit panel, thus ruling in
3Harris, Rau and Creno (2010), Archibold (2010)
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favor of the Department of Justice. However, in July, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the “show me your papers” clause, which consequently ended up being part
of the Arizona legislation.
4.3 Data and Research Design
To evaluate the impact of the Arizona Immigration Law on the stock of undoc-
umented population living in Arizona, it would be ideal to know the legal status of
individuals. Unfortunately, this information is not part of any state-level official sur-
vey in the U.S.4 Due to this limitation, I use the proportion of Hispanic noncitizens
as a proxy for legal status (Passel and Cohn, 2009a), (Passel and Cohn, 2009b).
I utilize the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data sets corresponding
to the period 2009-2012, and combine them within 5-month periods to estimate the
proportion of residents in each state who are reported to be Hispanic noncitizens.5
The analysis of this paper focuses on the demographic group more likely to be im-
pacted by the law: Hispanic noncitizens with a high school diploma or less, who
are between 15 and 45 of age.6 In the following analysis the first “post-treatment”
period is the 5-month term after the Arizona Immigration Law took effect, or the
interval between August and November 2010. Columns 2 and 3 of Table B.18 show
the proportion of the population who are Hispanic noncitizens for both Arizona and
the other states. The estimation corresponding to states other than Arizona shows
a steady path. On the other hand, the estimation corresponding to Arizona shows a
modest upward trend before the law was implemented, and an important reduction
4The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), is the only survey that records legal status
of individuals; however, except for California, the data are not available at the state level.
5This combination allows the estimation of short-term effects while adding enough observations
to increase precision. Estimations with data combined within quarters produce very similar results.
6Using the 2008 American Community Survey, Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2014) estimate
that in Arizona 90% of the population defined as noncitizen of working age with no more than high
school diploma were unauthorized.
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from that point and until the period between April and July 2011. Specifically, be-
tween the periods April-July 2010 and April-July 2011, the proportion of Hispanics
noncitizens went down from around 7.3% to around 5.7%. This period is similar
to the one between the partial implementation of the law and the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals to uphold the district court’s decision to block the
most controversial part of the law (see previous section). From this point, there is
an upward trend that lasted until the beginning of 2012, which is when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided to uphold parts of the original law, including the “show me
your papers” mandate. Table B.18 also shows in columns 4 and 5 the proportion
of Hispanics noncitizens with a high school diploma or less, between the ages of 15
and 45. This variable shows a path similar to the one corresponding to Hispanics
noncitizens.
The previous estimations offer a general idea of the trends of the variables that
motivate this study. However, they do not offer a causal interpretation. In order to
get a consistent estimate of the effect of Arizona Immigration Law, it is necessary
to obtain a suitable counterfactual. To obtain it, I use the synthetic control method
proposed in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). This method produces a
synthetic control by using convex combinations of potential control units (donors)
and selecting the one that better replicates the trajectory of the treated unit before
treatment. Formally, consider J + 1 units and T periods. Let unit 1 be the treated
one during the periods T0 + 1, ..., T . The J other units belong to the “donor” group.
Let YA denote the outcome of interest for the treated unit, and YD denote a matrix
containing the corresponding outcome for the donor units. The synthetic control
method solves the following minimization problem:
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Wˆ = argmin
W
(Ab −DbW )′V (Ab −DbW ) (4.1)
Where Ab is a (kx1) vector of pre-intervention variables that predict the outcome
of interest for the treated unit, DbW is a weighted average of the pre-treatment
vectors for the donor units, W is a (Jx1) vector of positive weights that add up to
one, and V is a positive (kxk) semidefinite matrix used to allow different weights to
the predictor variables.7 Once Wˆ is estimated, the synthetic control for period t is
calculated as Yˆt = Wˆ
′YDt. The estimations presented in the following section use the
pre-treatment values of the outcome variable as only predictors. The use of other
controls did not change the results of the synthetic control method.
This paper follows closely the application of synthetic control methods used in
Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2014). Specifically, once the synthetic Arizona is
obtained, the treatment effect is calculated as a difference-in-difference estimate.
Therefore, the identifying assumption is that in the absence of the Law, Arizona
would have followed the same trajectory as the synthetic Arizona. When using the
synthetic control method, I excluded from the sample the states that implemented
laws similar to SB 1070 between 2010 and 2012: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South
Carolina, and Utah. The results do not change if these states are not removed.
Table B.19 shows the weights used to construct the synthetic Arizona for the
two outcome variables. Four states received positive weights: Texas, California,
Washington, and Kentucky. As the table shows the weights are different for the two
7The estimations were performed using the Stata Code developed by Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller (2010), and its default option for selecting the V matrix that uses a regression-based
method to minimize the mean squared error for the pre-intervention period. Since the use of the
advanced fully nested option produced very similar results, I decided to report only the default
estimations.
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outcome variables. The large contribution of Texas and California to the synthetic
Arizona is not surprising since the two states have a relatively large Hispanic nonciti-
zen population. On the other hand, Washington, and Kentucky have relatively small
Hispanic noncitizen population, but they experienced trends similar to Arizona be-
fore the implementation of the Arizona Immigration Law. This explains why these
states were selected to build the synthetic Arizona.
To perform inference analysis, I use the permutation method proposed in Abadie,
Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). In particular, I calculate the same difference-
in-difference estimate outlined previously for every state in the sample to obtain
a distribution of “placebo” estimates. This distribution allows the comparison of
the estimated effect for Arizona with an effect estimated for a state chosen at ran-
dom. Under the hypothesis non-positive treatment effect, the estimate for Arizona
is not expected to be abnormally large within the distribution of placebo effects. To
estimate the p-value for this null hypothesis, I follow Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael
(2014).8 First, I rank the estimated treatment effects from the smallest to the largest,
then calculate the one-sided p-value as the position of the estimate corresponding to
Arizona over the total number of estimates.
4.4 Results
I start presenting graphic evidence that compares Arizona and the synthetic Ari-
zona before and after the implementation of the Immigration Law. Figure A.30 shows
this comparison for the proportion of Hispanic noncitizens. The synthetic Arizona
tracts very closely Arizona before the implementation of the law, but they begin to
diverge in the next period. This difference persists for around one year and then
vanishes, due to an increase in the proportion of Hispanic noncitizens in Arizona.
8Following Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2014), I exclude Arizona from the donor pool for each
placebo estimate.
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Interestingly, the increase coincides with the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals to uphold the district court’s decision to block the most controversial part
of the law (“show me your papers” provision). In other words, this change happened
around the time when likely the perception of severity of the bill was diminishing.
As explained before, the Supreme Court ended up upholding this provision in 2012.
This last decision may explain the downward trend of the proportion of Hispanic
noncitizens in Arizona since then. Because this change happened several periods
after the bill was implemented, I do not estimate effects specific for this period.
Figure A.31 shows the proportion of Hispanic noncitizens between 15 and 45 years
of age with high school diploma or less for both Arizona and its synthetic control.
The trends that the figure shows are similar to the previous one, but the differences
after the implementation of the bill are larger.
Table B.20 presents the corresponding estimates. Panel A shows the differences
between Arizona and the synthetic control for three periods. There are no significant
differences in the pre-treatment period. On the other hand, the differences in the
post-treatment period between August 2010 and July 2011 (first post-treatment pe-
riod) are -0.7 percentage points for Hispanic noncitizens, and -1.4 percentage points
for Hispanic noncitizens with high school diploma or less and of age between 15 and
45. Finally, the estimations in the post-period between August 2010 and December
2012 are approximately half of the ones estimated for the first post-treatment period.
Panel B of Table B.20 shows the difference-in-difference estimates for the first
post-treatment period. Since the differences in the pre-treatment period are relatively
small, these estimates are very similar to the simple difference estimates. For the
proportion of Hispanic noncitizens I find a reduction of around -0.7 percentage points,
which implies a reduction of approximately 10%. The application of the permutation
test outlined before (see Figures A.32 and A.33) brings about a one-tailed p-value of
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0.087. For the Hispanic noncitizens with High School Diploma or less between the
ages of 15 and 45 the estimated reduction is around 1.5%, which implies a reduction
of around 16%, with a one tailed p-value of 0.043.
Finally, Panel C of Table B.20 shows the estimates for the post-period between
August 2010 and December 2012. They are smaller than the ones estimated for
the first post-treatment period and no significant at the 10% significance level. The
smaller magnitude of these estimates is due mainly to the increase in the proportion
of Hispanic noncitizens around the second semester of 2011.
As a robustness check, I use the same methodology to estimate the effect for
groups less likely to be affected by SB 1070. Table B.21 shows the estimates corre-
sponding to Hispanics naturalized citizens, non-Hispanics non-citizens, and Hispanic
born in the U.S. For all of these groups, I find little evidence that they responded
to the law. The estimated effects are close to zero and not significant are standard
levels.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of the Arizona Immigration Law of 2010. The
results indicate that this bill produced a significant reduction in the proportion of
Hispanic noncitizens living in Arizona estimated to be between 10% and 16%. How-
ever, this impact disappeared one year after the implementation of the Law. The
short length of the effect could be partially explained by the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals to uphold the district court’s decision to block the most
controversial part of the law (“show me your papers” provision). That event likely
reduced the perceived severity of the Law.
These results support previous evidence of the high mobility of the undocumented
population in the United States, and contribute to the understanding of the effects
57
of immigration legislation. In particular, the evidence suggests that the response of
the undocumented population facing higher risk of deportation is to quickly move
out. The findings also suggest that when that risk diminishes, the undocumented
population increases.
It is important to point out the limitations of these results. The most important
one is the short length of the events that makes it difficult to estimate effects with
precision. Also, the unavailability of legal status in the official surveys, together with
the possibility of untruthful answers might bias the estimations. More research is
needed to shed light on the effects of the dynamic immigration policies at the federal
and state level, not only for the undocumented population, but also for citizens that
might be affected by those policies.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this dissertation is to estimate the effects of relevant public
policies using state-of-the-art methods, emphasizing the importance of the correct
identification of treatment effects. To reach this objective, the document studies three
public policies and uses different empirical methods to determine their impacts.
The first essay estimates the impact of tax notifications on compliance and re-
ported taxes in Ecuador using a regression discontinuity design that takes advantage
of a discrete increase in the probability of receiving a non-compliance notification.
The results indicate that the intervention causes the probability of compliance to
increase by around 67 percentage points. Also, the treatment causes taxes reported
to increase by approximately $1,400. I also find suggestive evidence that the effect of
the intervention persists in the year following the treatment, and that some taxpayers
believe that enforcement is a function of compliance, and act strategically to reduce
the tax burden and/or the probability of being targeted for enforcement. That be-
havior is consistent with theories that explain tax evasion with economics-of-crime
type of models.
These findings indicate that inexpensive tax compliance interventions can be used
effectively by tax authorities in low-income countries. This is important since tax
evasion is a particularly large problem in these countries, and since they likely have
less means and capability to pursue other, costlier, compliance strategies. Thus,
while it is difficult to know the extent to which the results found in his paper extend
to countries with different tax systems, the results suggest that there may well be
scope for low-income countries to reduce the inefficiencies and inequities caused by
tax evasion by utilizing low-cost compliance strategies such as the one studied here.
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The second essay uses a large-scale field experiment to analyze the role of infor-
mation interventions as policy instruments to induce conservation of electricity. A
unique feature of the electricity tariff in Quito, Ecuador is used to make salient a
sizable price notch that apparently had not historically induced consumption reduc-
tion. The experiment also explores the effect of social norms to promote conservation
of electricity.
Results are consistent with recent literature finding that social comparisons are
effective to encourage environmental conservation. They show that consumers his-
torically consuming above the notch respond to the social comparison by reducing
consumption by approximately 1%. The size of this effect is around half the size
of OPOWER Home Energy Reports utilized in the U.S., but the size we find still
suggests that low-cost information interventions can induce energy conservation.
On the other hand, the estimate for the price notch salience is approximately one
third of that of the social comparison, and it is not statistically significant at standard
levels. The lack of response to this treatment could be explained by frictions that do
not allow households to adjust consumption, or because most customers did not read
the messages. Given the sizable effect of the social comparison treatment, it must be
the case that at least a small proportion of targeted customers read the messages and
were able to successfully reduce consumption. Hence, the findings imply that the
social comparison treatment was indeed more effective in promoting conservation.
However, there is suggestive evidence that the effect of the price salience treatment
exists only for households who were just above the notch, whereas the effect of the
social comparison is significant for both households who were just above and well
above the notch. These heterogeneous effects for the price notch salience treatment
might explain its relatively small overall treatment effect.
The experiments also explores the effect of a third treatment that combines the
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price notch and social comparison information. Results show that the effect of this
treatment falls between the other two. This suggests that the price salience infor-
mation does not strengthen the impact of the social comparison, and might even
weaken it. This could be explained if the extra information reduces the probability
that the targeted customer reads and understands the message.
Results also show that none of the treatments have a significant effect for house-
holds historically consuming below the notch. Hence, we find no evidence of a non-
desirable “boomerang” effect that increases consumption. Also, and consistent with
previous literature, we find that the effect of the social comparison intervention di-
minishes over time.
These results contribute to the understanding of the capacity of information inter-
ventions to encourage conservation of energy in the context of a developing country.
The larger effect of the social comparison treatment suggests that similar interven-
tions could be used in longer term projects to promote conservation and reduce
the fiscal burden of electricity subsidies. The findings for the price notch salience
treatment support previous literature finding that non-linear price incentives are not
effective in reducing consumption of electricity. However, the results also suggest
that information that makes salient non-linear price schemes might be effective if
targeted to the population with consumption levels just above price notches.
The last essay estimates the impact of the Arizona Immigration Law of 2010.
Results indicate that this bill produced a significant reduction in the proportion
of Hispanic noncitizens living in Arizona estimated to be between 10% and 16%.
However, this impact disappeared one year after the implementation of the Law.
The short length of the effect could be partially explained by the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals to uphold the district court’s decision to block the
most controversial part of the law (“show me your papers” provision). That event
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likely reduced the perceived severity of the Law.
These results support previous evidence of the high mobility of the undocumented
population in the United States, and contribute to the understanding of the effects
of immigration legislation. In particular, the evidence suggests that the response of
the undocumented population facing higher risk of deportation is to quickly move
out. The findings also suggest that when that risk diminishes, the undocumented
population tends to increase.
It is important to point out the limitations of these results. The most important
one is the short length of the events that makes it difficult to estimate effects with
precision. Also, the unavailability of legal status in the official surveys, together with
the possibility of untruthful answers might bias the estimations. More research is
needed to shed light on the effects of the dynamic immigration policies at the federal
and state level, not only for the undocumented population, but also for citizens that
might be affected by those policies.
The results of the three essays presented in this document contribute to the
understanding of the impact of the public policies that motivated this dissertation.
The conclusions delineated here could be valuable for policymakers interested in
strengthen the impact of these policies. The findings of this document also contribute
to the understanding of the behavior of individuals in the context of economic and
social incentives.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES
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Figure A.1: Histogram of the running variable
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Figure A.2: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (total assets)
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Figure A.3: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (taxable income)
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Figure A.4: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (deductable costs
and expenses)
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Figure A.5: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (net worth)
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Figure A.6: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (years of opera-
tion)
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Figure A.7: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (age of legal
representative)
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Figure A.8: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (corporation (bi-
nary))
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Figure A.9: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (special taxpayer
(binary))
Note: Special taxpayers are those required to withhold taxes from other taxpayers
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Figure A.10: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (legal represen-
tative college education (binary))
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Figure A.11: Discontinuities of covariates at the selection threshold (female legal
representative (binary))
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Figure A.12: Discontinuity in the probability of receiving the tax notification (First
Stage)
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
−1 −.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations dbove or below the cut−off
Predicted probability Local average
Fitted values estimated with a cubic polynomial. Robust standard errors
Estimated discontinuity =0.515 (t=17.01)
Figure A.13: Discontinuity in the probability of compliance
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Figure A.14: Discontinuity in reported taxes (post-treatment ITA 2010)
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Figure A.15: Persistence effect (Discontinuity in reported taxes - ITA 2011)
83
.
45
.
5
.
55
.
6
.
65
Un
de
r−
re
po
rti
ng
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
−1 −.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Standard deviations dbove or below the cut−off
Predicted probability Local average
Fitted values estimated with a linear polynomial. Robust standard errors
Estimated discontinuity =−0.054 (t=−2.80)
Figure A.16: Persistence effect (Discontinuity in the probability of under-reporting
taxes - ITA 2011)
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Figure A.17: Persistence effect (Discontinuity in the probability of over-reporting
taxes - ITA 2011)
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Figure A.18: Persistence effect (Discontinuity in the difference between under-
reported ITA 2011 and 2010)
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Figure A.19: Sample tariff function for EEQ residential customers. December 2013
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Figure A.20: Discontinuity in the density at the notch
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Figure A.21: Bunching around the notch
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Figure A.22: Consumption distribution prior to notch’s creation
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Figure A.23: EEQ’s electricity bill sample
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 SUMINISTRO:    
Plan/Geocódigo: XX    XX-XX-X-XX       
 
INFORMACIÓN IMPORTANTE 
Ahorre Electricidad y Ahorre Dinero 
Estimado Cliente: 
La siguiente información de su consumo mensual de electricidad durante el año pasado puede 
ser de su interés. 
 
Su consumo promedio mensual fue aproximadamente:   XXX kWh 
Un hogar similar al suyo consume en promedio:    110 kWh 
 
Esto significa que, durante el año pasado usted consumió aproximadamente X,XX % más que 
otros hogares similares. Le exhortamos a que haga un uso eficiente de la energía para ahorrar 
dinero.                     
Por favor lea con atención los siguientes consejos sobre ahorro de energía eléctrica para que 
empiece a ahorrar dinero ya! Comparta esta información con los demás miembros del hogar.  
 No deje la puerta del refrigerador abierta por mucho tiempo y asegúrese que la 
puerta cierre herméticamente. 
 No deje el televisor encendido si nadie lo mira. 
 No olvide apagar las luces al salir de una habitación.  
 
¡AHORRE ELECTRICIDAD, AHORRE DINERO! 
 
XXXXXX-X 
Figure A.24: Sample letter for social comparison (Spanish)
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 Meter ID:    
Geocode: XX    XX-XX-X-XX       
 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION  
Save Electricity and Save Money 
Dear Customer: 
We thought that you might be interested in the following information regarding your monthly 
electricity use over the past year. 
 
Your average monthly consumption was:     XXX kWh 
The average household like you consumes:     110 kWh 
 
Over the past year, this means that you have consumed approximately X,XX % more 
electricity per month than others like you.  We encourage you to use energy wisely to save 
money.    
Please read carefully the following savings tips so you can learn how to save right away. 
Share this information with all the other members of the household.  
 Don't leave the refrigerator door open for too long and make sure it closes tightly. 
 Turn off the television if nobody is watching it.  
 Don't forget to turn off the lights when leaving a room.  
 
¡SAVE ELECTRICITY, SAVE MONEY! 
XXXXXX-X 
Figure A.25: Sample letter for social comparison (translation)
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 SUMINISTRO:    
Plan/Geocódigo: XX    XX-XX-X-XXXX       
 
INFORMACIÓN IMPORTANTE 
Ahorre Electricidad y Ahorre Dinero 
Estimado Cliente: 
La tarifa eléctrica establecida por el CONELEC funciona de manera progresiva. Esto implica 
que si usted consume más de 110 kWh al mes, hay un incremento importante de costo en su 
factura. 
La siguiente información de su consumo mensual de electricidad durante el año pasado puede 
ser de su interés. 
 
Su consumo promedio mensual fue aproximadamente:   XXX kWh 
 
Esto significa que, durante el año pasado usted pagó en promedio alrededor de US$ XX por 
consumo de electricidad cada mes (US$ XXX al año). Si usted reduce su consumo mensual de 
electricidad en X kWh (alrededor de X,XX % de su consumo promedio), su pago mensual se 
reduciría cerca de XX,XX %, por lo cual usted ahorraría US$ XX al año. Le exhortamos a que 
hago un uso eficiente de energía para ahorrar dinero.  
Por favor lea con atención los siguientes consejos sobre ahorro de energía eléctrica para que 
empiece a ahorrar dinero ya! Comparta esta información con los demás miembros del hogar.  
 No deje la puerta del refrigerador abierta por mucho tiempo y asegúrese que la 
puerta cierre herméticamente. 
 No deje el televisor encendido si nadie lo mira. 
 No olvide apagar las luces al salir de una habitación.  
 
¡AHORRE ELECTRICIDAD, AHORRE DINERO! 
 
XXXXXXX 
Figure A.26: Sample letter for price notch salience (Spanish)
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 Meter ID:    
Geocode: XX    XX-XX-X-XXXX       
 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
Save Electricity and Save Money 
Dear Customer: 
The electric tariff established by CONELEC is progressive. What this means for you is that there 
is a large increase in your monthly bill should you consume more than 110 kWh. 
We thought that you might be interested in the following information regarding your monthly 
electricity use over the past year. 
 
Your average monthly consumption was:     XXX kWh 
 
Over the past year, this means that you have paid around US$ XX a month for the electricity 
you use (US$ XXX per year). If you were to reduce your electricity use by X kWh per month 
(around X,XX % of your current consumption), you would reduce your monthly energy bill by 
nearly XX,XX % and would save approximately US$ XX per year.  We encourage you to use 
energy wisely to save money. 
Please read carefully the following savings tips so you can learn how to save right away. 
Share this information with all the other members of the household.  
 Don't leave the refrigerator door open for too long and make sure it closes tightly. 
 Turn off the television if nobody is watching it.  
 Don't forget to turn off the lights when leaving a room.  
 
¡SAVE ELECTRICITY, SAVE MONEY! 
 
XXXXXXX 
Figure A.27: Sample letter for price notch salience (translation)
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 SUMINISTRO:    
Plan/Geocódigo: XX    XX-XX-X-XXX       
 
INFORMACIÓN IMPORTANTE 
Ahorre Electricidad y Ahorre Dinero 
Estimado Cliente: 
La tarifa eléctrica establecida por el CONELEC funciona de manera progresiva. Esto implica 
que si usted consume más de 110 kWh al mes, hay un incremento importante de costo en su 
factura. 
La siguiente información de su consumo mensual de electricidad durante el año pasado puede 
ser de su interés. 
 
Su consumo promedio mensual fue aproximadamente:   XXX kWh 
Un hogar similar al suyo consume en promedio:    110 kWh 
 
Esto significa que, durante el año pasado usted pagó en promedio alrededor de US$ XX por 
consumo de electricidad cada mes (US$ XXX al año). Si usted reduce su consumo mensual de 
electricidad en X kWh (alrededor de X,XX % de su consumo promedio), su pago mensual se 
reduciría cerca de XX,XX %, con lo cual ahorraría US$ XX al año. Le exhortamos a que haga 
un uso eficiente de electricidad para ahorrar dinero.  
Por favor lea con atención los siguientes consejos sobre ahorro de energía eléctrica para que 
empiece a ahorrar dinero ya! Comparta esta información con los demás miembros del hogar.  
 No deje la puerta del refrigerador abierta por mucho tiempo y asegúrese que la 
puerta cierre herméticamente. 
 No deje el televisor encendido si nadie lo mira. 
 No olvide apagar las luces al salir de una habitación.  
 
¡AHORRE ELECTRICIDAD, AHORRE DINERO! 
 
XXXXX-X 
Figure A.28: Sample letter for social comparison and price salience com-
bined (Spanish)
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 Meter ID:    
Geocode: XX    XX-XX-X-XXXX       
 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
Save Electricity and Save Money 
Dear Customer: 
The electric tariff established by CONELEC is progressive. What this means for you is that there 
is a large increase in your monthly bill should you consume more than 110 kWh. 
We thought that you might be interested in the following information regarding your monthly 
electricity use over the past year. 
 
Your average monthly consumption was:     XXX kWh 
The average household like you consumes:     110 kWh 
Over the past year, this means that you have paid around US$ XX a month for the electricity 
you use (US$ XXX per year). If you were to reduce your electricity use by X kWh per month 
(around X,XX % of your current consumption), you would reduce your monthly energy bill by 
nearly XX,XX % and would save approximately US$ XX per year.  We encourage you to use 
energy wisely to save money. 
Please read carefully the following savings tips so you can learn how to save right away. 
Share this information with all the other members of the household.  
 Don't leave the refrigerator door open for too long and make sure it closes tightly. 
 Turn off the television if nobody is watching it.  
 Don't forget to turn off the lights when leaving a room.  
 
¡SAVE ELECTRICITY, SAVE MONEY! 
 
XXXXXXX 
Figure A.29: Sample letter for social comparison and price salience com-
bined (Translation)
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Figure A.30: Proportion of noncitizen Hispanic in Arizona and synthetic control
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Figure A.31: Proportion of noncitizen Hispanic between 15 and 45 years of age with
high school diploma or Less in Arizona and synthetic control
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Figure A.32: Difference in the proportion of noncitizen Hispanic relative to the
synthetic Control - 46 states
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Figure A.33: Difference in the proportion of noncitizen Hispanic between 15 and 46
years of age with high school diploma or less relative to the synthetic control - 46
states
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APPENDIX B
TABLES
Table B.1: Examples of application of the income tax
advance (ITA)
Example Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
(A) ITA (2010) 100 100 100
(B) IT Withheld (2009) 70 70 70
(C) Anticipated Payment (A-B) 30 30 30
(D) Incurred IT (2010) 120 80 80
(E) IT Withheld (2010) 50 50 85
ITA filed in 2010
(F) Greater btw A and D 120 100 100
(G) Taxes Due (F-C-E) 40 20 -15
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
Note: This table shows three examples of the Income Tax (IT)
reports in Ecuador for the fiscal year 2010. As discussed in
the text, if the ITA is greater than the Incurred IT, the former
becomes the relevant IT that the taxpayer has to file.
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Table B.2: Frequencies by province
Province Under-reported
ITA 2010
Selected to
receive the tax
notification
Received
the tax
notification
Corrected or
justified
differences
(Count) (Percent) (Count) (Count) (Count)
Azuay 2,225 6.10 448 436 651
Bol´ıvar 123 0.34 60 60 76
Carchi 380 1.04 110 109 87
Can˜ar 322 0.88 160 92 91
Chimborazo 697 1.91 279 277 364
Cotopaxi 509 1.40 41 41 69
El Oro 1,586 4.35 295 291 366
Esmeraldas 550 1.51 133 130 121
Gala´pagos 145 0.40 12 12 19
Guayas 12,385 33.97 928 879 2,182
Imbabura 865 2.37 121 121 284
Loja 724 1.99 390 376 403
Los R´ıos 630 1.73 35 34 55
Manab´ı 1,927 5.29 269 267 356
Morona S. 169 0.46 79 46 49
Napo 135 0.37 71 71 86
Orellana 262 0.72 87 87 129
Pastaza 112 0.31 41 41 43
Pichincha 10,224 28.04 996 988 2,239
Sta. Elena 285 0.78 42 41 56
Sto. Domingo 715 1.96 106 106 140
Sucumb´ıos 256 0.70 149 144 151
Tungurahua 1,121 3.07 129 129 183
Zamora Ch. 110 0.30 47 44 46
Total 36,457 100 5,028 4,822 8,246
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.3: Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation
Panel A. Outcome variables
Corrected or justifed difference (binary) 0.23 0.42
Post-treatment reported ITA 2010 (US$) 1,803.52 5,131.16
Reported ITA 2011 (US$) 2,923.13 6,907.22
Under-reporting ITA 2011 (binary) 0.60 0.49
Over-reporting ITA 2011 (binary) 0.28 0.45
Difference under-reported ITA (2011 minus 2010) (US$) a -494.80 3,509.21
Panel B. Covariates
Assets (US$ in thousands) 197.51 472.43
Taxable income (US$ in thousands) 422.45 891.66
Deductible costs and expenses (US$ in thousands) 407.50 867.84
Net worth (US$ in thousands) 95.45 305.17
Age of legal representative (years) 48.12 12.41
Female legal representative (binary) 0.28 0.45
Legal representative has college education (binary) 0.45 0.50
Special taxpayer (binary) b 0.05 0.22
Corporation (binary) 0.57 0.49
Years of operation (years) 12.78 8.94
Notes: All the covariates correspond to the pre-treatment period.
a Conditional on under-reporting in 2011.
b Special taxpayers are those required to withhold taxes from other taxpayers.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.4: Regression discontinuity estimates of the discontinuity in the proba-
bility of receiving the tax notification (first stage)
Order of polynomial
Discontinuity
(1) (2)
Panel A. Bandwidth: 1 std. dev.
Cubic a 0.762*** 0.750***
(0.023) (0.019)
Quadratic 0.755*** 0.762***
(0.017) (0.014)
Linear 0.779*** 0.804***
(0.011) (0.009)
Controls No Yes
Observations 14,340 14,260
Panel B. Bandwidth: 0.5 std. dev.
Cubic 0.752*** 0.761***
(0.032) (0.026)
Quadratic a 0.746*** 0.732***
(0.025) (0.020)
Linear 0.766*** 0.773***
(0.016) (0.013)
Controls No Yes
Observations 6,084 6,052
Panel C. Bandwidth: 0.25 std. dev.
Quadratic a 0.771*** 0.786***
(0.034) (0.028)
Linear 0.738*** 0.745***
(0.023) (0.019)
Controls No Yes
Observations 3,120 3,105
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
a Preferred order polynomial for each bandwith selected using the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC) calculated for regressions that include additional covariates.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
100
Table B.5: Regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of the tax notification
in the probability of compliance (ITA 2010)
Treatment effect
Intent-to treat effect
Effect of the
notification (LATE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Bandwidth: 1 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial a 0.515*** 0.505*** 0.675*** 0.673***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
Quadratic polynomial 0.505*** 0.520*** 0.669*** 0.683***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Linear polynomial 0.541*** 0.563*** 0.694*** 0.700***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 14,340 14,260 14,340 14,260
Panel B. Bandwidth: 0.5 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial 0.509*** 0.521*** 0.676*** 0.685***
(0.043) (0.039) (0.046) (0.046)
Quadratic polynomial a 0.494*** 0.483*** 0.663*** 0.660***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)
Linear polynomial 0.520*** 0.533*** 0.678*** 0.689***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,084 6,052 6,084 6,052
Panel C. Bandwidth: 0.25 std. dev.
Quadratic polynomial 0.485*** 0.511*** 0.629*** 0.650***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.049) (0.047)
Linear polynomial a 0.496*** 0.510*** 0.672*** 0.685***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,120 3,105 3,120 3,105
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The additional covariates
are defined in the text. LATE is estimated using Two-stage Least Squares.
a Preferred order polynomial for each bandwith selected using the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) calculated for the reduced form regressions that include additional co-
variates.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.6: Regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of the tax notification in
reported taxes (ITA 2010 (U.S. Dollars))
Treatment effect
Intent-to treat effect
Effect of the
notification (LATE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Bandwidth: 1 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial a 787.28** 1,013.75*** 1,036.75** 1,356.11***
(309.88) (200.05) (405.46) (269.28)
Quadratic polynomial 637.57*** 696.00*** 845.51*** 913.85***
(239.10) (158.46) (315.19) (208.34)
Linear polynomial 698.38*** 835.01*** 896.28*** 1,038.20***
(169.47) (119.48) (216.05) (148.69)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 14,061 13,982 14,061 13,982
Panel B. Bandwidth: 0.5 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial a 1,173.22*** 1,406.41*** 1,563.56*** 1,859.55***
(425.81) (260.25) (564.00) (350.20)
Quadratic polynomial 820.33** 923.60*** 1,105.33** 1,267.52***
(321.51) (201.31) (430.04) (277.75)
Linear polynomial 623.39*** 741.50*** 814.14*** 959.79***
(220.08) (142.21) (285.39) (184.16)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,995 5,963 5,995 5,963
Panel C. Bandwidth: 0.25 std. dev.
Quadratic polynomial 1,343.79*** 1,367.99*** 1,749.16*** 1,753.07***
(450.28) (278.06) (582.91) (361.80)
Linear polynomial a 837.21*** 1,072.55*** 1,138.16*** 1,443.01***
(292.71) (189.44) (394.89) (256.12)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,074 3,059 3,074 3,059
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off. Robust standard
errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The additional covariates are defined in
the text. LATE is estimated using Two-stage Least Squares.
a Preferred order polynomial for each bandwith selected using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) calculated for the reduced form regressions that include additional covariates.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.7: Regression discontinuity estimates of the persistence of the effect of
the tax notification in reported taxes (ITA 2011 (U.S. Dollars))
Treatment effect
Intent-to treat effect
Effect of the
notification (LATE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Bandwidth: 1 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial 477.61 653.87*** 626.47 866.29***
(392.55) (251.29) (512.98) (333.76)
Quadratic polynomial 439.10 399.02** 580.91 520.77**
(307.50) (197.11) (405.34) (257.34)
Linear polynomial a 422.17* 539.15*** 541.83* 668.39***
(218.39) (143.85) (279.28) (178.43)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 13,697 13,622 13,697 13,622
Panel B. Bandwidth: 0.5 std. dev.
Cubic polynomial 638.25 665.25** 847.87 870.84**
(535.26) (320.62) (708.15) (421.44)
Quadratic polynomial 679.62* 607.99** 913.60* 825.86**
(406.26) (252.19) (543.26) (343.40)
Linear polynomial a 310.51 394.30** 404.60 506.56**
(283.07) (175.58) (367.76) (225.66)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,854 5,824 5,854 5,824
Panel C. Bandwidth: 0.25 std. dev.
Quadratic polynomial 771.02 464.28 995.74 587.39
(569.90) (333.88) (732.90) (423.41)
Linear polynomial a 456.60 575.37** 619.88 767.99**
(375.46) (235.39) (507.75) (314.69)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,997 2,983 2,997 2,983
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The additional covariates are
defined in the text. LATE is estimated using Two-stage Least Squares.
a Preferred order polynomial for each bandwith selected using the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC) calculated for the reduced form regressions that include additional covariates.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.8: Regression discontinuity estimates of the effect (LATE) of the tax
notification on the probability of attrition and on reported taxes with bounds
analysis
Bandwidth (standard deviations) 1 0.5 0.25
Panel A. Dependent variable:
Reported post-treatment ITA 2010 - US$
Probability of attrition 0.012 0.012 0.003
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013)
RDD estimate 1,356.11*** 1,859.55*** 1,443.01***
(269.28) (350.20) (256.12)
Lower bound 1,339.78 1,822.29 1,428.21
(273.90) (344.22) (264.72)
Upper bound 1,493.59 2,022.95 1,511.14
(326.31) (374.14) (272.11)
Order of polynomial Cubic Cubic Linear
Observations 14,061 5,963 3,059
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Reported ITA 2011 - US$
Probability of attrition 0.001 0.002 -0.007
(0.009) (0.013) (0.019)
RDD estimate 668.39*** 506.56** 767.99**
(178.43) (225.66) (314.69)
Lower bound 660.00 492.54 769.10
(181.25) (229.58) (323.73)
Upper bound 709.77 604.59 867.80
(204.32) (242.83) (315.87)
Order of polynomial Linear Linear Linear
Observations 13,622 5,824 2,983
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The order polynomial for each
bandwidth is the preferred one selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) cal-
culated for the reduced form regressions that include additional covariates. All regressions
include the additional covariates defined in the text. LATE is estimated using Two-stage
Least Squares. Bounds standard errors based on 500 bootstrapped samples.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.9: Regression discontinuity estimates of the persistence of the effect
(LATE) of the tax notification
Bandwidth (standard deviations) 1 0.5 0.25
Panel A. Dependent variable: under-reporting ITA 2011 (binary)
RDD estimate -0.077*** -0.089*** -0.116**
(0.024) (0.034) (0.050)
Order of Polynomial Linear Linear Linear
Observations 13,622 5,824 2,983
Panel B. Dependent variable: over-reporting ITA 2011 (binary)
RDD estimate 0.047** 0.049 0.101**
(0.023) (0.032) (0.047)
Order of Polynomial Linear Linear Linear
Observations 13,622 5,824 2,983
Panel C. Dependent variable: difference Under-reported ITA
(2011 minus 2010) (US$) a
RDD estimate -1,041.35** -475.70 -790.21*
(443.35) (292.94) (415.67)
Order of Polynomial Cubic Linear Linear
Observations 7,962 3,386 1,739
Notes: The bandwidths are standard deviations above or below the cut-off . Robust
standard errors in parentheses;* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The order polynomial
for each bandwidth is the preferred one selected using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) calculated for the reduced form regressions that include additional covariates. All
regressions include the additional covariates defined in the text. LATE is estimated using
Two-stage Least Squares.
a Conditional on under-reporting in 2011.
Source: Author calculations and SRI.
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Table B.10: Summary statistics: Monthly electricity consumption 2013 (kWh)
Month Mean Standard deviation Median
January 153.0 129.9 130
February 142.2 119.7 122
March 136.8 116.9 117
April 144.1 122.9 123
May 151.1 127.6 130
June 147.9 125.4 127
July 138.9 189.1 118
August 149.2 125.0 128
September 144.8 123.6 124
October 144.9 122.0 124
November 147.4 124.3 126
December 148.3 127.2 126
Source: Author calculations and EEQ.
Statistics correspond to the Quito Metropolitan District.
Table B.11: Monthly electricity use for EEQ households
End Use
Average usage Share of
(kWh per month) total
Refrigerator 39.8 37.7%
Other appliances 12.8 12.1%
Television 12.7 12.0%
Lighting 9.4 8.9%
Washing machine 8.8 8.3%
Water heater 8.0 7.6%
Ironing 6.6 6.5%
Cooking 4.0 3.8%
Music Eeectronics 2.8 2.7%
Heating 0.7 0.7%
Source: ENERINTER Asesor´ıa Energe´tica Internacional, 2012.
Data for EEQ households with monthly average usage between
99 and 110 kWh
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Table B.12: Pre-treatment: Household yearly average in 2013 monthly consumption
(kWh)
Group Count Average Median standard
deviation
Panel A. All sample
Control 15,875 112.35 112.33 7.22
Social comparison 15,854 112.30 112.17 7.21
Price notch salience 15,860 112.35 112.25 7.22
Both 15,853 112.32 112.17 7.17
Panel B. Above the notch
Control 9,425 117.42 117.42 4.34
Social comparison 9,359 117.37 117.33 4.37
Price notch salience 9,406 117.42 117.42 4.35
Both 9,381 117.35 117.33 4.38
Panel C. Below the notch
Control 6,450 104.95 104.92 2.92
Social comparison 6,495 104.98 105.00 2.92
Price notch salience 6,454 104.96 105.00 2.92
Both 6,472 105.02 105.08 2.88
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the pretreatment vari-
able – average 2013 monthly consumption – for each household in the
treatment groups. The notch that defines Panels B and C is 110
kWh/month as explained in the text.
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Table B.13: Pre-treatment: Test of differences in household average 2013 monthly
consumption across groups
Difference Difference Standard p-value
(%) error
Panel A. All sample
Social comparison vs. Control -0.057 -0.05% 0.081 0.49
Price notch salience vs. Control -0.007 -0.01% 0.081 0.94
Both vs. Control -0.036 -0.03% 0.081 0.65
Price notch salience vs. Social comparison 0.050 0.04% 0.081 0.54
Both vs. Social comparison 0.020 0.02% 0.081 0.80
Both vs. Price notch salience 0.030 0.03% 0.081 0.71
Panel B. Above the notch
Social comparison vs. Control -0.048 -0.04% 0.064 0.45
Price notch salience vs. Control -0.007 -0.01% 0.063 0.91
Both vs. Control -0.071 -0.06% 0.064 0.26
Price notch salience vs. Social comparison 0.041 0.04% 0.064 0.52
Both vs. Social comparison -0.023 -0.02% 0.064 0.72
Both vs. Price notch salience 0.064 0.05% 0.064 0.32
Panel C. Below the notch
Social comparison vs. Control 0.035 0.03% 0.051 0.50
Price notch salience vs. Control 0.013 0.01% 0.051 0.79
Both vs. Control 0.073 0.07% 0.051 0.15
Price notch salience vs. Social comparison -0.021 -0.02% 0.051 0.68
Both vs. Social comparison 0.039 0.04% 0.051 0.45
Both vs. Price notch salience -0.060 -0.06% 0.051 0.24
Notes: This table reports tests of differences in means of the pretreatment 2013 average
monthly consumption across the households in each of the treatment groups. We report p-
values of tests of the null hypothesis that the means are equal for each pairwise comparison.
Standard errors are robust. The notch that defines Panels B and C is 110 kWh/month as
explained in the text.
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Table B.14: Estimates of average treatment effects for households above the notch.
First quarter after the intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social comparison -1.362** -1.247*** -1.226** -1.219**
(0.599) (0.461) (0.603) (0.603)
Price notch salience -0.378 -0.426 -0.213 -0.206
(0.612) (0.469) (0.613) (0.613)
Both -0.760 -1.064** -0.710 -0.710
(0.607) (0.464) (0.606) (0.606)
Constant 121.986*** - - -
(0.438) - - -
Pre-treatment consumption No Yes No No
Post-treatment indicator No No Yes No
Year-by-month fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes
Houshold fixed effects No No No Yes
N 110,242 110,242 1,018,486 1,018,486
Notes: The dependent variable is a “month” of consumption, which is the average daily
consumption during the meter-read window multiplied by 365/12. The sample is all house-
holds who had pre-treatment average annual consumption above 110 kWh. Specifications
(1) and (2) use post-treatment observations for the period April-June 2014 in a cross sec-
tional setting. Specifications (3) and (4) use a panel setting with data ranging from February
2012 to June 2014. Pre-treatment consumption is the monthly consumption for the periods
April-June, 2013 and January-February, 2014, see text for details. Robust standard errors
clustered at the household level in parentheses;* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
109
Table B.15: Estimates of average treatment effects for households above the notch.
First quarter after the intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 111-115 kWh
Social comparison -1.555 -1.266* -1.104 -1.121
(0.970) (0.739) (0.985) (0.985)
Price notch salience -0.935 -1.521* -0.606 -0.596
(0.970) (0.777) (0.988) (0.988)
Both -0.630 -1.174 -0.342 -0.345
(1.003) (0.756) (1.007) (1.008)
Constant 117.854*** - - -
(0.713) - - -
N 41,230 41,230 380,893 380,893
Panel B. 116-125 kWh
Social comparison -1.175 -1.236** -1.307* -1.287*
(0.759) (0.590) (0.764) (0.763)
Price notch salience -0.076 0.202 0.014 0.024
(0.783) (0.588) (0.780) (0.780)
Both -0.723 -0.976* -0.952 -0.950
(0.758) (0.586) (0.758) (0.757)
Constant 124.414*** - - -
(0.552) - - -
N 69,012 69,012 637,593 637,593
Pre-treatment consumption No Yes No No
Post-treatment indicator No No Yes No
Year-by-month fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes
Houshold fixed effects No No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a “month” of consumption, which is the average daily
consumption during the meter-read window multiplied by 365/12. The sample is all house-
holds who had pre-treatment average annual consumption above 110 kWh. Specifications
(1) and (2) use post-treatment observations for the period April-June 2014 in a cross sec-
tional setting. Specifications (3) and (4) use a panel setting with data ranging from February
2012 to June 2014. Pre-treatment consumption is the monthly consumption for the periods
April-June, 2013 and January-February, 2014, see text for details. Robust standard errors
clustered at the household level in parentheses;* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table B.16: Estimates of average treatment effects for households below the notch.
First quarter after the intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social comparison 0.371 -0.607 0.160 0.159
(0.711) (0.564) (0.714) (0.713)
Price notch salience 0.372 -0.192 0.026 0.026
(0.725) (0.554) (0.721) (0.721)
Both -0.102 -0.664 -0.214 -0.190
(0.706) (0.557) (0.714) (0.713)
Constant 110.352*** - - -
(0.520) - - -
Pre-treatment consumption No Yes No No
Post-treatment indicator No No Yes No
Year-by-month fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes
Houshold fixed effects No No No Yes
N 75,680 75,680 699,151 699,151
Notes: The dependent variable is a “month” of consumption, which is the average daily
consumption during the meter-read window multiplied by 365/12. The sample is all house-
holds who had pre-treatment average annual consumption below 110 kWh. Specifications
(1) and (2) use post-treatment observations for the period April-June 2014 in a cross sec-
tional setting. Specifications (3) and (4) use a panel setting with data ranging from February
2012 to June 2014. Pre-treatment consumption is the monthly consumption for the periods
April-June, 2013 and January-February, 2014, see text for details. Robust standard errors
clustered at the household level in parentheses;* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
111
Table B.17: Estimates of average treatment effects by quarter for households above
the notch
April-June July-September October-December
Social comparison -1.216** -0.861 -0.428
(0.603) (0.657) (0.739)
Price notch salience -0.200 -0.126 -0.212
(0.613) (0.663) (0.736)
Both -0.707 -0.387 -0.569
(0.606) (0.658) (0.743)
Notes: The dependent variable is a “month” of consumption, which is the average daily
consumption during the meter-read window multiplied by 365/12. The estimations are from
panel data specifications with year-by-month and household fixed effects. Data ranges from
February 2012 to December 2014. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level
in parentheses;* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table B.18: Proportion of Hispanic noncitizen population in Arizona and other states
Hispanic noncitizens
Hispanic noncitizens between 15 and 45 years of age
High school diploma or less
Arizona Other states Arizona Other states
Dec-Mar 6.12% 4.07% 8.07% 5.49%
Apr-Jul 6.58% 4.08% 9.03% 5.55%
Aug-Nov (2009) 6.98% 4.17% 8.88% 5.54%
Dec-Mar 6.29% 3.96% 8.74% 5.36%
Apr-Jul 7.34% 4.15% 10.10% 5.67%
Aug-Nov (2010) 6.07% 4.10% 7.62% 5.57%
Dec-Mar 6.11% 3.96% 7.75% 5.36%
Apr-Jul 5.67% 3.92% 7.33% 5.39%
Aug-Nov (2011) 6.15% 3.96% 8.74% 5.35%
Dec-Mar 6.95% 3.92% 8.45% 5.20%
Apr-Jul 5.87% 3.87% 7.77% 5.29%
Aug-Nov (2012) 5.53% 3.96% 7.68% 5.34%
Source: Current Population Survey
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Table B.19: States with positive weights in the synthetic control estimations
Hispanic noncitizens
Hispanic noncitizens between 15 and 45 years of age
High school diploma or less
Texas 40.3% 15.1%
Washington 24.4% 40.5%
California 23.3% 41.5%
Kentucky 12.1% 2.9%
Table B.20: Estimated impact of the introduction of SB 1070 on the proportion of
noncitizen Hispanics among Arizona residents in the respective group
All
High school diploma
or Less (15-45)
Panel A. Average differences
relative to the synthetic control
1. Pre-treatment (2009 -Jul 2010) 0.000 0.000
2. Post-treatment (Aug 2010 - Jul 2011) -0.007 -0.014
3. Post-treatment (Aug 2010 - Dec 2012) -0.004 0.007
Panel B. Diff-in-Diff. (A2-A1)
Difference post - pre -0.007 -0.015
Rank lowest to highest effect 4 2
Equivalent p-value (one-tailed test) 0.087 0.043
Panel C. Diff-in-Diff. (A3-A1)
Difference post - pre -0.004 -0.007
Rank lowest to highest effect 7 6
Equivalent p-value (one-tailed test) 0.152 0.130
Notes: One-sided p-value calculated as the relative position of the estimate corresponding
to Arizona within the placebo effects distribution.
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Table B.21: Robustness checks. Estimated impact of the introduction of SB 1070
for groups non affected by the legislation
Estimate Rank Equivalent
p-value
Panel A. Post treatment (Aug 2010 - Jul 2011)
Share of Hispanic naturalized citizens -0.0010 16 0.35
Share of non-Hispanic non-citizens -0.0020 15 0.33
Share of Hispanic born in the U.S. -0.0007 16 0.35
Panel B. Post treatment (Aug 2010 - Dec 2012)
Share of Hispanic naturalized citizens 0.0007 28 0.61
Share of non-Hispanic non-citizens -0.0009 25 0.54
Share of Hispanic born in the U.S. 0.0005 23 0.50
Notes: This table shows difference-in-difference estimates calculated from the synthetic con-
trol calculation, see text fro details. One-sided p-value calculated as the relative position of
the estimate corresponding to Arizona within the placebo effects distribution.
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